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ABSTRACT
Patents are generally considered to be the most territorial of all the various forms of intellec-
tual property.  Even patent law, however, has confronted issues involving the application of a
U.S. patent to extraterritorial activity.  The Supreme Court has expressed an interest in both
issues – the extraterritorial application of U.S. law and patent law.  At times, these interests have
intersected.  Notwithstanding the Court’s recent elaborations on extraterritoriality, the approach
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has been, at best, inconsistent.  At times the
court has afforded extraterritorial protection, even in the face of strong territorial language in the
patent statute itself.  At other times, however, it has approached the issue of extraterritoriality
more restrictively, even when the statute itself expressly contemplates the regulation of activities
outside of the United States.  This dynamic has been addressed by myself and other scholars.
More recently, however, the Federal Circuit has addressed the issue of patent damages for
extraterritorial activities.  These scenarios have arisen because there necessarily has been an act of
domestic patent infringement.  The damages theory advocated by the patent holder, however, has
attempted to ensnare overseas sales, either under a lost-profits or reasonable-royalty theory.  Addi-
tionally, the Federal Circuit has begun to address the appropriate scope of damages for infringe-
ment under section 271(f) of the Patent Act, a provision that defines infringement as the
exportation of all the components of an invention, or a single component with no substantial
noninfringing use, where it is to be assembled abroad.  Necessarily, this provision contemplates
the regulation of foreign markets through the domestic hook of acts of exportation.  The Federal
Circuit, nevertheless, rejected the patentee’s requested remedy in this case.
This Article turns to the issue of the extraterritorial reach of patent damages.  It analyzes the
Federal Circuit’s recent pronouncements using the two-step method articulated by the Supreme
Court in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community. This analysis suggests that damages
for infringement under various aspects of the Patent Act can be treated differently with respect to
extraterritoriality.  This Article goes on to suggest that the Federal Circuit’s approach lacks
nuance to account for the particular economic and legal circumstances that differentiate the
different infringement provisions at stake.  It draws on earlier work where I advocated for a
conflicts-based approach to extraterritorial application of U.S. patents, and extends that work to
these scenarios, offering a more balanced approach to assessing whether damages are appropriate
in these circumstances.
Finally, this Article explores whether the various damages theories involved in these cases,
regardless of the territorial limits, suggest it is time to revisit the foreseeability/proximate cause
aspect of Rite-Hite. The theories of damages seem quite far removed from the actual acts of
infringement, even if they occurred within the United States.  Some scholars have begun work on
this enterprise, and these cases suggest such consideration is ripe.
INTRODUCTION
Two areas of interest at the Supreme Court in recent years have been
patent law and extraterritoriality.  As to the former, after nearly two decades
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of relatively little involvement in patent law,1 the Supreme Court turned its
attention to the patent system, and this interest has continued to the pre-
sent.2  As to the latter, the Supreme Court has addressed the presumption
against extraterritoriality four times since 2007,3 following a dearth of nearly
fourteen years.4  The Court appeared poised to address the presumption
1 See generally Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 387.
2 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP
THEORY 62, 64 (2013) (noting that the Supreme Court took twenty-four patent cases from
its October 2000 through October 2012 terms). The Court took six patent cases its 2013
term: Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014), Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744
(2014); Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); Med-
tronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2013); three in its 2014 term:
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2014); Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco
Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015); Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015);
two cases in its 2015 term: Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016);
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016); and took six cases in its 2016
term: Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (mem.); SCA Hygiene Prod.
Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017); Life Techs. Corp. v.
Promega Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016) (mem.); Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l,
Inc., 137 S Ct. 546 (2016) (mem.); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Grp., LLC, 137
S. Ct. 614 (2016) (mem.); Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 137 S. Ct. 808 (2017) (mem.).
3 The Supreme Court addressed the presumption in Rasul v. Bush dealing with the
habeas statute but concluded that it had “no application to the operation of the habeas
statute with respect to persons detained within ‘the territorial jurisdiction’ of the United
States.”  542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949)).  Some Justices have discussed extraterritoriality in concurrences or dissents. See,
e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 373 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(using presumption to argue that the wire fraud statute does not cover defrauding a for-
eign government of tax revenue).  Justice Ginsburg discussed extraterritoriality in her dis-
sent in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. in the context of the Copyright Act.  133 S. Ct.
1351, 1376 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Kirtsaeng answered the question of whether
the United States had a domestic or international rule of copyright exhaustion, and the
Court adopted the latter. Id. at 1355–56 (majority opinion).  The issue was whether an
authorized foreign sale of a copyrighted work exhausted the U.S. copyright. Id. The
Court concluded that it did. Id.  This dynamic is not a typical “extraterritorial” application
of U.S. law because copyright exhaustion is not an attempt to regulate foreign activity;
instead, the foreign activity impacts rights within the United States.  Exhaustion territorial-
ity operates in a manner akin to prior art: foreign activities can preclude a United States
patent applicant from receiving a patent.  35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).  This dynamic is not
the extraterritorial reach of United States patent law but instead a determination that some
acts outside of the United States have consequences on the validity of a U.S. patent applica-
tion. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Should Foreign Patent Law Matter?, 34 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 581, 583–88 (2012) [hereinafter Holbrook, Foreign Patent Law]; Timothy R. Holbrook,
Territoriality Waning? Patent Infringement for Offering in the United States to Sell an Invention
Abroad, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 707 (2004) [hereinafter Holbrook, Territoriality Waning].
4 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 769 (1993); Sale v. Hai-
tian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 174 (1993) (applying presumption); Smith v. United
States, 507 U.S. 197, 203–04 (1993); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244,
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twice more in its October 2016 term,5 although it ultimately did not address
the presumption in one of those cases.
The Court’s review of the presumption in a variety of contexts is not
surprising given the confusion surrounding its applicability among the lower
courts.6  The Court’s cases have considered the extraterritorial reach of U.S.
laws in a variety of contexts, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO),7 the Alien Tort Statute,8 and United States securi-
ties laws.9  Given the Court’s interest in both patent law and extraterritorial-
ity, it should come as no surprise that the Supreme Court has considered the
intersection of these concerns, addressing the presumption in the context of
patent law.10  The Court has noted that “[t]he presumption that United
States law governs domestically but does not rule the world applies with par-
ticular force in patent law.”11
The strength of the presumption in the patent context has its roots in
the lengthy history recognizing the domestic nature of patent law.12  The
Patent Act also contains very explicit territorial limits.  For example, 35
U.S.C. § 271(a)—the basic infringement provision of the Patent Act—specifi-
cally notes that all of the acts of infringement must take place “within the
248 (1991).  The Court addressed the extraterritorial reach of the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act, which modified the Sherman Act to “exclude[ ] . . . much anticompeti-
tive conduct that causes only foreign injury.”  F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran
S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158 (2004).  The Act created some exceptions to that general prohibi-
tion where generally conduct “significantly harms imports, domestic commerce, or Ameri-
can exporters.” Id.  The Court never expressly addressed the presumption, however.  The
Court permitted a cause of action by domestic purchasers for a global price-fixing scheme
that impacted prices in the United States. Id. at 159.
5 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 291 (2016) (mem.) (granting petition for writ of
certiorari); Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016) (mem.) (granting
petition for writ of certiorari as to the second question presented).
6 See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010) (“The criti-
cisms seem to us justified.  The results of judicial-speculation-made-law—divining what
Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court—demon-
strate the wisdom of the presumption against extraterritoriality.  Rather than guess anew in
each case, we apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable background against
which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.” (footnote omitted)).
7 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2016).
8 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013).
9 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 250–51.
10 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441, 454–55 (2007).  The Court inter-
preted the provision at issue in Microsoft in its October 2016 term, though it did not
address the presumption. See Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., No. 14-1538, 2017 WL
685531 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2017).
11 Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 454–55.
12 See, e.g., Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915)
(“The right conferred by a patent under our law is confined to the United States and its
Territories and infringement of this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a
foreign country.” (citations omitted)); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195
(1857) (“The power thus granted is domestic in its character, and necessarily confined
within the limits of the United States.”).
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United States.”13  Donald Chisum, author of the influential multi-volume pat-
ent law treatise Chisum on Patents, has stated that “[o]f the three principal
forms of intellectual property, patent rights are most explicitly territorial.”14
Notwithstanding the “particular force” of the presumption and the
express language in the statute, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has been rather inconsistent in assessing the extraterritorial reach of
U.S. patents.15  At times, the court expressly has applied the presumption,
giving it forceful effect.16  Other times, the court mentions the presumption
yet dismisses its application.17  And yet at other times, the court fails to men-
tion the presumption explicitly, ignoring the significant body of law that that
underlies it.18  The court has at times afforded extraterritorial reach in the
face of seemingly clear language, while other times rejecting such scope.
With a global market place, issues of extraterritoriality have become
more pressing in patent law.  A significant literature has developed address-
ing the extraterritorial scope of U.S. patent law in a variety of contexts.19
13 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
14 Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property: Lessons
From Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 603, 605 (1997).
15 Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2119, 2136 (2008) (“The Federal Circuit’s exploration of the issue of extraterritoriality has
given, at best, inconsistent results.  One can discern two strands of the court’s jurispru-
dence: a strict territorial approach on the one hand, and a willingness to provide extrater-
ritorial relief on the other.”).
16 See, e.g., Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1307
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
17 See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA,
Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“We are mindful of the presumption against
extraterritoriality.”); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility After Trans-
ocean, 61 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1098 (2012) (noting that the Federal Circuit “recognized the
extraterritorial reach of its holding and even acknowledged that the presumption against
the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws suggests a narrower construction of the statute”
but ultimately “the court dismissed this concern”).
18 See, e.g., Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert.
granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016) (mem); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418
F.3d 1282, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing the territorial limits of U.S. patents but not
discussing the presumption).  The majority in Promega did state that “[w]e are mindful of
the fact that the Supreme Court has cautioned against the extraterritorial application of
United States laws,” but then dismissed such concerns because “Congress’ chosen language
assigns liability to LifeTech’s conduct within the United States, based on its extraterritorial
effect.” Promega, 773 F.3d at 1353 n.10.  The majority, however, did not mention the pre-
sumption nor engage with the caselaw discussing its application.  Chief Judge Prost’s dis-
sent in Promega alludes to the presumption, although she did not use that terminology. Id.
at 1360 (Prost, C.J., dissenting in part) (noting that “the Supreme Court has cautioned
against employing a policy-oriented approach to judicial decision making when it would
cause law to have extraterritorial application”).
19 See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Hiding Behind Nationality: The Temporary Presence Exception
and Patent Infringement Avoidance, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2008); Dan L.
Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global Computer Networks, 68 TUL.
L. REV. 1 (1993); Dan L. Burk, Transborder Intellectual Property Issues on the Electronic Frontier,
6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 9 (1994); Eric W. Guttag, When Offshore Activities Become Infringing:
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Typically these issues have addressed liability: whether a party should be con-
sidered an infringer in light of extraterritorial activity.  More recently, how-
ever, the Federal Circuit has addressed extraterritoriality in the context of
patent damages.20  In these latter contexts, the court did apply the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality forcefully, refusing to allow the patent owner
damages for overseas sales even in the face of a domestic nexus for such
damages.21
This Article will explore the Federal Circuit’s approach to, and reason-
ing in, these cases in light of the Supreme Court’s recent elaboration of the
presumption.  It will assess whether the two sets of cases—those from
infringement under § 271(a) and those under the expressly extraterritorial
provision of § 271(f)—merit similar or different treatment.  It ultimately con-
cludes that the Federal Circuit’s analysis as to these provisions is inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent.  These provisions should not necessarily be
treated similarly under current law.  The Article then provides an approach
that would look to various comity factors in determining whether such dam-
Applying § 271 to Technologies That “Straddle” Territorial Borders, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1
(2007); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Potential Extraterritorial Consequences of Akamai, 26 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 499 (2012); Amy L. Landers, U.S. Patent Extraterritoriality Within the Interna-
tional Context, 36 REV. LITIG. 28 (2016); Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 6
SEDONA CONF. J. 117, 120–23 (2005); Marketa Trimble, Cross-Border Injunctions in U.S. Pat-
ent Cases and Their Enforcement Abroad, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 331 (2009); Scott A.
Cromar, Note, The Location of the Contemplated Sale as the Ultimate Guide in “Offer to Sell”
Transnational U.S. Patent Infringement Cases, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1755; James Ernstmeyer,
Note, Does Strict Territoriality Toll the End of Software Patents?, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1267 (2009);
Melissa Y. Lerner, Note, You Can Run, But You Can’t Hide: The Expansion of Direct Infringe-
ment and the Evisceration of Preventive Contracting in Maersk, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 207 (2011); Rex W. Miller, II, Note, Construing “Offers to Sell” Patent Infringement: Why
Economic Interests Rather than Territoriality Should Guide the Construction, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 403
(2009); Elizabeth M.N. Morris, Comment, Territorial Impact Factors: An Argument for Deter-
mining Patent Infringement Based Upon Impact on the U.S. Market, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 351 (2006); Craig E. Walter, Comment, Extraterritorial Software Protection
Under § 271(f): A Call to Congress to Fix a Statute That Was Not Broken, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 129
(2011); Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Note, Divided Infringement: Expanding the Extraterritorial
Scope of Patent Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281 (2007).
20 See, e.g., Carnegie Mellon, 807 F.3d at 1308, reh’g en banc denied in part, 805 F.3d 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2015); WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1349–52
(Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016) (mem.), remanded
to 837 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (reinstating opinion in relevant part); Power Inte-
grations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
For commentary on these cases, see Bernard Chao, Patent Law’s Domestic Sales Trap, 93
DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 87 (2016) [hereinafter Chao, Patent Law’s Domestic Sales Trap]; Ber-
nard Chao, Patent Imperialism, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 77 (2014) [hereinafter Chao,
Patent Imperialism]; Sapna Kumar, Patent Damages Without Borders, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
(forthcoming 2017).
21 See, e.g., Carnegie Mellon, 807 F.3d at1307, reh’g en banc denied in part, 805 F.3d 1382;
WesternGeco L.L.C., 791 F.3d at 1352, cert. granted and judgment vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2486,
remanded to 837 F.3d at 1360 (reinstating opinion in relevant part); Power Integrations, Inc.,
711 F.3d at 1369–70.
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ages are appropriate.  It then addresses a concern beyond extraterritorial
damages: whether the law needs to develop a more coherent theory of the
harm from patent infringement that should be redressable, even for domes-
tic acts of infringement.
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I explores the presumption against
extraterritoriality generally and its particular application in patent law.  It
begins with an overview of the Supreme Court’s recent caselaw that has
resulted in a formalized, two-step methodology for assessing the extraterrito-
rial reach of U.S. law.  It then reviews the Federal Circuit’s inconsistent
approach to determining the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patents.  Part III
then looks at the Federal Circuit’s treatment of extraterritorial damages.
Turning to the RJR Nabisco two-step process, it evaluates the appropriateness
of the Federal Circuit’s application of a strict territorial rule.  Part IV offers
an alternative, harmonized approach for these issues.  Part V suggests that,
beyond territorial concerns, the recent caselaw on damages shows a consider-
able lack of an appropriate theory for damages.  The foreseeability prong of
Rite-Hite seems to have been stretched beyond its proper contour, suggesting
the need for courts and commentators to begin to rethink the proximate
cause aspect of damages.  Part VI concludes.
I. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND PATENT LAW
Although Congress can only exercise the powers delegated to it by the
Constitution, there is no dispute that Congress has the power to regulate
activity outside of the boundaries of the United States.22  Minimally, Con-
gress has the authority to regulate its citizens wherever they are in the
world.23  Congress also has the power to regulate commerce with foreign
countries, which provides the necessary authority for Congress to regulate
noncitizens abroad.24
There are reasons, however, to be concerned about whether Congress
has exercised, and should have exercised, such power.  This Part begins by
exploring the justifications for presuming that Congress did not intend
domestic laws to regulate activities outside of the United States.  It then turns
to the Supreme Court’s recent reengagement with the presumption and its
efforts seemingly to clarify the presumption’s applicability.  Finally, this Part
details the interaction between the presumption and patent law, focusing on
22 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Congress has
the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.”).
23 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285–86 (1952) (“[T]he United States is
not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct of its own citi-
zens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or
their nationals are not infringed.” (quoting Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941)));
McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 118 (1st Cir. 2005) (“This doctrine is based on an idea
that Congressional power over American citizens is a matter of domestic law that raises no
serious international concerns, even when the citizen is located abroad.”).
24 McBee, 417 F.3d at 119.
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the somewhat inconsistent treatment afforded to the presumption by the
Federal Circuit.
A. The Policies Underlying the Presumption Against Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Law
Although Congress has the power to regulate activities outside of the
United States, the Supreme Court has made clear that, as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation, courts should presume that laws do not have such reach
absent a clear signal from Congress.25  Courts and commentators have
offered a variety of justifications for the presumption.  The courts have sug-
gested that using domestic laws extraterritorially could violate international
law.26  Comity and the potential for creating conflicts with the laws of foreign
countries both loom large in this calculus.27  Courts have identified concerns
with separation of powers—the usurpation of the executive by acts of Con-
gress—as also supporting the presumption.28  The reality is that no single
theory justifies the presumption.  Needless to say, the presumption has also
been criticized, particularly for its inconsistent application.29
B. The Supreme Court’s Recent Reinvigoration of the Presumption
The Supreme Court is apparently aware of these criticisms.  The pre-
sumption basically had remained dormant at the Supreme Court from the
1940s until the 1990s.30  Aside from a brief mention of the presumption, the
Court had not applied the presumption from 1949 until 1991.31  The Roberts
25 Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
26 Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual
Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 514–15 (1997).
27 See, e.g., Aramco, 499 U.S. at 256 (“It is also reasonable to conclude that had Con-
gress intended Title VII to apply overseas, it would have addressed the subject of conflicts
with foreign laws and procedures.”); see also Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,
455 (2007) (“[F]oreign law ‘may embody different policy judgments about the relative
rights of inventors, competitors, and the public in patented inventions.’” (quoting Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 28, id. (No. 05-1056))).
28 McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963)
(stating that allowing the National Labor Relations Board to reach foreign-flag vessels
“would inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs and be entirely infeasible in
actual practice”); see also NLRB v. The Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979)
(characterizing McCulloch as raising a “serious question of separation of powers which in
turn would have implicated sensitive issues of the authority of the Executive over relations
with foreign nations”).
29 See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and the Presump-
tion Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 601 (1990) (“[C]ourts appear to be
using outcome-determinative tests to consistently grant or deny extraterritorial claims
according to the type of statute involved in the dispute.”).
30 Maggie Gardner, Essay, RJR Nabisco and the Runaway Canon, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
134, 136 (2016).
31 William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Two Steps, AJIL
UNBOUND 45, 45 n.1 (2016).
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Court has picked the issue back up since the 1990s.  Since 2007, the Court
has decided four cases dealing with the presumption.  The Court also heard
two cases in its October 2016 term that appeared to deal with the presump-
tion, although the Court ultimately (and surprisingly) did not rely on the
presumption in one of them.32  The Court undoubtedly wants to reduce the
confusion surrounding the presumption.33
The Court’s reengagement with the presumption coincided to some
extent with its reengagement with patent law.34  In Microsoft v. AT&T, the
Supreme Court addressed for the first time 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) of the Patent
Act.35  Congress adopted § 271(f) to legislatively overrule Deepsouth Packing
Co. v. Laitram,36 an earlier Supreme Court decision that relied upon con-
cerns of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patents.37  In Deepsouth, the accused
infringer had manufactured all of the components of the patented shrimp
deveining machine; the accused infringer then sent those parts outside of the
United States to be assembled abroad.38  The Supreme Court concluded
there was no infringement for making or selling the patented invention in
the United States under this fact pattern,39 noting that “[o]ur patent system
makes no claim to extraterritorial effect.”40
Congress ultimately disagreed, adopting § 271(f)(1), which directly over-
ruled Deepsouth by making it an act of infringement to export the unassem-
bled components of the patented invention abroad with an intent to
assemble them.41  Congress went beyond the Deepsouth scenario in two ways.
32 Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., No. 14-1538, 2017 WL 685531 (U.S. Feb. 22,
2017); see Timothy R. Holbrook, Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp. and the Absent
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, PATENTLYO (Feb. 26, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/
patent/2017/02/technologies-presumption-extraterritoriality.html (discussing the absence
of any mention of the presumption in the case dealing with the extraterritorial provision of
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012)).
33 But see Gardner, supra note 30, at 135 (“[T]he Court missed an opportunity to pro-
vide much-needed guidance to judges on how to interpret statutes that rebut the presump-
tion.”).  Other commentators have suggested that the Court has “jettisoned decades of
settled law, casting doubt on long-accepted practices of statutory construction and
instructing the lower courts to turn a deaf ear to indications of congressional intent any
subtler than the proverbial meat axe.”  Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison
v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial
Application of American Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655, 655 (2011).
34 See Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413,
1421–25 (2016) (discussing the Supreme Court’s reengagement with patent law over the
last fifteen years).
35 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
36 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
37 Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 444; see also Holbrook, Territoriality Waning, supra note 3, at
720–21.
38 Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 523.
39 Id. at 527 (framing the issue as follows: “[D]id Deepsouth ‘make’ (and then sell)
something cognizable under the patent law as the patented invention, or did it ‘make’
(and then sell) something that fell short of infringement?”).
40 Id. at 531.
41 The specific statutory language is:
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First, § 271(f)(1) applies when “all or a substantial portion of the compo-
nents” are manufactured in the United States and exported for assembly.  In
Deepsouth, the accused infringer had manufactured all of the components.
The language of “a substantial portion” broadens § 271(f)(1) beyond the
facts of Deepsouth.42  Second, Congress went even further beyond Deepsouth by
adopting § 271(f)(2).  This provision defines as infringement the exporta-
tion of a component with no substantial noninfringing use when that compo-
nent is intended to be assembled abroad into the patented invention.43
The ultimate impact of this provision is to regulate foreign markets for
the patent.  Consequently, § 271(f) provides extraterritorial protection to the
patent owner.  Although there is a domestic nexus, the provision targets for-
eign markets, those where the component or components have been
exported for assembly.  If these items return to the United States, they would
infringe under other statutory provisions, such as § 271(a)’s prohibition on
the importation, use, or sale of the patented invention.44  Section 271(f) is
solely about using a United States patent to regulate foreign markets.
Given this express extraterritorial reach, it was not surprising that the
Supreme Court agreed to review this provision in Microsoft.  The Court con-
fronted two issues in the case: whether computer software could constitute a
“component” and whether the copying of such software constituted “supply-
ing” under § 271(f).45  AT&T’s patent covered “an apparatus for digitally
encoding and compressing recorded speech,” which Microsoft’s software
infringed when installed on a computer.46  Microsoft sent the software
abroad, where copies were made to install the software on computers
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the
United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented inven-
tion, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such man-
ner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2012).
42 Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., No. 14-1538, 2017 WL 685531, at *10 (U.S. Feb.
22, 2017) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“It is clear from
the text of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) that Congress intended not only to fill the gap created by
Deepsouth . . . but to go at least a little further.”).
43 Specifically:
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the
United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or
especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity
of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is
uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or
adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside of the
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2).
44 Id. § 271(a).
45 See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007).
46 Id.
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abroad.47  The Court concluded that software in the abstract was not a com-
ponent—though software in a substantiated form could be48—and that copy-
ing did not constitute supplying of the component.49  Importantly, in
reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly relied on the presumption
against extraterritoriality in construing the statute.50  The presumption
applied even though § 271(f) is an extraterritorial provision.51  The Court
noted that the presumption “applies with particular force in patent law.”52
Microsoft, therefore, was a tea leaf as to what was to follow.53
Microsoft dealt with a fairly narrow issue regarding a specialized infringe-
ment provision of the Patent Act.  In particular, it dealt with a provision
designed to provide extraterritorial relief to patent holders.  As such, the
decision had a limited ability to afford broader, more general guidance as to
the presumption.  The Supreme Court did not wait long to address the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality more broadly, doing so in the context of
securities regulation in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.54  In Morrison,
the issue was whether section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act
applied to activity taking place in Australia.55  The Court concluded that sec-
tion 10(b) did not reach extraterritorial activities.56  The Court recognized
that, in the securities regulation context, the various tests the courts devel-
oped “were not easy to administer.”57  The Court acknowledged that
“[c]ommentators have criticized the unpredictable and inconsistent applica-
tion of § 10(b) to transnational cases.”58  The Court bolstered the strength
and general applicability of the presumption in reaching its conclusion:
47 Id. at 442; see also Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringe-
ment in an Era of 3D Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1348–50 (2015) (discussing the
facts of the case).
48 Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 449 (“Until it is expressed as a computer-readable ‘copy,’ e.g.,
on a CD–ROM, Windows software—indeed any software detached from an activating
medium—remains uncombinable. . . . Abstract software code is an idea without physical
embodiment, and as such, it does not match § 271(f)’s categorization . . . .”).
49 Id. at 454 (“The absence of anything addressing copying in the statutory text weighs
against a judicial determination that replication abroad of a master dispatched from the
United States ‘supplies’ the foreign-made copies from the United States within the intend-
ment of § 271(f).”).
50 Id. (“Any doubt that Microsoft’s conduct falls outside § 271(f)’s compass would be
resolved by the presumption against extraterritoriality . . . .”)
51 Id. at 455–56.
52 Id. at 454–55.
53 Cf. Holbrook, supra note 2, at 72 (discussing the Supreme Court’s use of patent law
to explore legal issues in other areas).
54 561 U.S. 247 (2010).  For a general discussion of Morrison’s potential applicability to
patent law and the International Trade Commission, see Holbrook, Foreign Patent Law,
supra note 3, at 602–07.
55 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 250–51.
56 Id. at 265.
57 Id. at 258.
58 Id. at 260.
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The results of judicial-speculation-made-law—divining what Congress would
have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court—demon-
strate the wisdom of the presumption against extraterritoriality.  Rather than
guess anew in each case, we apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a
stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable
effects.59
The Court, in a bit of hyperbole, went on to note that, “[w]hen a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”60
The Court gave the presumption some legal and figurative teeth by noting
“the presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven
watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity
is involved in the case.”61  The Court emphasized that the presumption is not
a “clear statement” rule.62  The Court did acknowledge, though, that if the
focus of the statute is domestic, then the conduct may fall within the ambit of
the statute regardless of the presumption.63 The Court concluded, though,
that the focus of the statute at issue was domestic and did not ensnare the
conduct in the case.64
As with Microsoft, it was not clear if the Supreme Court meant to alter the
landscape of the presumption across all fields or whether this decision was
specific only to securities law.65  The Supreme Court was not yet done
addressing the presumption, however, and expanding its application.  In
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Court addressed whether a party could
sue Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) for acts occurring outside of the United States.66  The ATS is different
than most statutes, however, because “[i]t does not directly regulate conduct
or afford relief,” instead “allow[ing] federal courts to recognize certain
causes of action based on sufficiently definite norms of international law.”67
The Court nevertheless concluded that the presumption should inform the
59 Id. at 261 (footnote omitted).
60 Id. at 255.
61 Id. at 266.
62 Id. at 265 (“But we do not say, as the concurrence seems to think, that the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality is a ‘clear statement rule,’ if by that is meant a requirement
that a statute say ‘this law applies abroad.’  Assuredly context can be consulted as well.”
(internal citation omitted) (quoting id. at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring))). But see id. at 278
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“First, the Court seeks to transform the presumption from a flexi-
ble rule of thumb into something more like a clear statement rule.”).
63 Id. at 266; see also Brilmayer, supra note 33, at 663 (describing this “focus” analysis as
“a major loophole”).
64 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (“[W]e think that the focus of the Exchange Act is not
upon the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities
in the United States.”).
65 See, e.g., Holbrook, Foreign Patent Law, supra note 3, at 604 (“The question arises,
then, as to how broadly applicable the language of Morrison is.  Does Morrison represent a
sweeping alteration to the presumption, creating close to a ‘clear statement’ rule require-
ment, or is it limited to the context of § 10(b) of the securities law?”).
66 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662, 1664 (2013).
67 Id. at 1664.
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scope of the ATS.68  Ultimately, the Court held that these claims could not be
brought under the ATS due to the presumption because these foreign acts
did not “touch and concern the territory of the United States” with “suffi-
cient force to displace the presumption.”69
The Court was not yet finished refining its jurisprudence regarding the
presumption against extraterritoriality.  In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Com-
munity, the Court confronted the extraterritorial scope of RICO.70  The
plaintiffs alleged “RJR Nabisco and numerous related entities . . . participated
in a global money-laundering scheme in association with various organized
crime groups.”71
In assessing the extraterritorial reach of RICO, the Court formalized a
general, two-step methodology for assessing the application of the presump-
tion.72  First, a court should assess “whether the presumption against extra-
territoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a clear,
affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.”73  If the presumption
has been rebutted, then the statute is afforded extraterritorial reach.  If after
step one, however, a court concludes “the statute is not extraterritorial,” then
the statute may yet afford protection.74  Step two is to “determine whether
the case involves a domestic application of the statute . . . by looking to the
statute’s ‘focus.’”75  Under step two,
If the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States,
then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other con-
duct occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a
foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial
application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.76
In other words, if the key acts relevant to the statute occur in the United
States, then other, extraterritorial conduct will not be enough to preclude
the statute’s application.  In contrast, if the key conduct vis-a`-vis the statute’s
focus is abroad, then the statute will not reach that conduct.  The Court thus
elaborated “the” test for assessing the extraterritorial reach of any statute, be
it a statute that “regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers
jurisdiction.”77
68 Id. (“But we think the principles underlying the canon of interpretation similarly
constrain courts considering causes of action that may be brought under the ATS.”).
69 Id. at 1669.
70 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty. (RJR), 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2016).
71 Id. at 2098.
72 Dodge, supra note 31, at 46 (noting that RJR “formalizes Morrison’s approach” by
adopting the two-step approach).
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Applying this methodology to the facts before it yielded mixed results;
the Court assessed the extraterritorial reach of two provisions.78  First, it ana-
lyzed whether “RICO’s substantive prohibitions, contained in [18 U.S.C.]
§ 1962, apply to conduct that occurs in foreign countries.”79  It then assessed
whether “RICO’s private right of action, contained in § 1964(c), appl[ies] to
injuries that are suffered in foreign countries.”80  As to the former, the Court
unanimously concluded that the presumption was rebutted and thus § 1962
does apply to some foreign conduct.81  Interestingly, in contrast with the pre-
vious cases, the Court afforded some extraterritorial reach.  As to the latter,
however, a divided Court, in a 4-3 decision, held that § 1964(c) does not
reach injuries suffered outside of the United States, limiting RICO to domes-
tic injuries.82
Many believed that the Supreme Court would revisit the presumption in
the context of patent law again during its October 2016 term.  The Court
heard the case Life Technologies v. Promega, which presented the question of
whether a “single, commodity component” can nevertheless constitute “a
substantial portion of the components of a patented invention.”83  The Court
rejected the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of that provision, noting that
“substantial” denoted a quantitative assessment of the invention’s compo-
nents, not a qualitative one as posited by the Federal Circuit.84  As a result,
there was no infringement in the case because the accused infringer had
supplied only one component of the patented invention.85
Surprisingly, however, the Court did not rely upon, nor even mention,
the presumption against extraterritoriality.  Such omission is surprising.  The
briefing in the case generally engaged with the presumption.86  During oral
argument, the Court and the litigants had a variety of exchanges regarding
78 The Court thus applied the presumption on a provision-by-provision basis.  Dodge,
supra note 31, at 48.  Some commentators have called this move “consistent with what the
Supreme Court has done in past cases,” id., whereas others have decried this move as a
“new requirement,” Gardner, supra note 30, at 139.
79 RJR, 136 S. Ct. at 2099.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 2101.
82 Id. at 2106.
83 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 2017 WL
685531 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2017) (No. 14-1538) (quoting 35 U.S.C. 271(f)(1) (2012)) (Ques-
tion 2); see also Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016) (mem.) (grant-
ing writ of certiorari as to the second question only).
84 Life Techs., 2017 WL 685531, at *6 (“[W]e conclude that a quantitative interpreta-
tion hews most closely to the text of the statute and provides an administrable
construction.”).
85 Id.
86 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 24–33, Life Techs. Corp., 2017 WL 685531 (No. 14-
1538); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 28–30, Life
Techs., 2017 WL 685531 (No. 14-1538); Brief for Respondent at 44–51, Life Techs., 2017 WL
685531 (No. 14-1538).
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the presumption.87  In fact, the Chief Justice (although he ultimately recused
himself) engaged in an exchange with petitioner’s counsel on the topic.  He
seemed to be suggesting that RJR removed consideration of the presumption
against extraterritoriality in that case:
I’m not sure I agree with your understanding of the extraterritorial
principle.  I don’t—I mean, do you really take that down into the minutiae
of every little clause?  It seems to me it’s once the law applies, then you apply
normal principles of statutory interpretation.  I think we have cases about
that in other—in other areas, which is sort of what is the reach, I think, may
be the presumption against infringements in sovereign immunity, is—a case
I can’t recall right away that said, well, once you get over it, you know, it’s
over, and then you apply normal principles.88
The case to which the Chief Justice referred likely was RJR.  As petitioner’s
counsel quickly noted, however, the Supreme Court specifically noted the
role of the presumption in statutory construction “into the minutiae” in
Microsoft.89
The Court’s silence may be more telling than it appears.  Given the
Chief Justice’s questions, the failure to mention the presumption could
reflect sub silentio a shift in the Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence post-
RJR.90  Applying the RJR methodology to § 271(f) would appear to end at
step one: the statute clearly contemplates extraterritorial application of U.S.
law with the hook of domestic manufacture of the components.  The silence
in Life Technologies may reflect this shift.
Finally, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case that explores the
extraterritorial reach of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unjustified
force.91  The case involved the cross-border killing of a Mexican national by a
87 Holbrook, supra note 32 (“At oral argument, the questions from the justices sug-
gested that [the case was about the presumption].  The term was used over twelve times in
the argument, with the Chief Justice engaging in a colloquy with Carter Phillips about
whether this case truly involved extraterritoriality.”).
88 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Life Techs., 2017 WL 685531 (No. 14-1538).
89 Id. at 12–13 (“[T]hat’s exactly the opposite of what the Court said in Microsoft.  In
Microsoft, the Court said that the issue is not simply, is this extraterritorial, because there’s
no question that 271(f) operates extraterritorially.  The question is the sweep of 271(f).”
(statement of Carter Phillips)).
90 See supra note 33 (discussing the importance of the Supreme Court’s silence on the
presumption).
91 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 291 (2016) (mem.) (granting petition for writ of
certiorari); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, id. (No 15-118), 2015 WL 4537883, at *i
(U.S. July 23, 2015) (formulating the first question presented as “Does a formalist or func-
tionalist analysis govern the extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment’s prohi-
bition on unjustified deadly force . . . ?”).
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U.S. Border Patrol agent.92  The Court heard oral argument on February 21,
2017, and a decision is expected by the end of June 2017.93
C. Application to Patent Law Generally
The courts have long recognized the territorial limits to U.S. patents and
patent law.94  With the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, primary
responsibility for the development of patent law, and necessarily its territorial
limits and exceptions, fell on that court’s shoulders.  Unfortunately, the
court’s analysis of these territorial limits, and its invocation of the presump-
tion, have been inconsistent at best.
1. Examples of the Federal Circuit Limiting the Extraterritorial Reach of
Patents
At times, the Federal Circuit has relied upon the presumption, using
generally a strict approach to issues of extraterritoriality.95  For example, the
court has made clear that infringement of a patented method requires the
infringer to perform all of the steps of the method within the United
States.96  For some methods, such as those performed over the Internet, the
various steps of the method may be performed in different geographic loca-
tions.97  Such methods would not be infringed by a United States patent, and
92 Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted,
771 F.3d 818 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d in part, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per
curiam), cert. granted sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 291 (2016) (mem.).
93 No. 15-118, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?File
Name=/docketfiles/15-118.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
94 See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972);
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (“The right con-
ferred by a patent under our law is confined to the United States and its Territories and
infringement of this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country.”
(internal citation omitted)); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1857) (“But
these acts of Congress do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the
United States; and as the patentee’s right of property and exclusive use is derived from
them, they cannot extend beyond the limits to which the law itself is confined.”).
95 See generally Holbrook, supra note 17, at 2130–42 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s
sometimes strict approach to extraterritoriality).
96 NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We
therefore hold that a process cannot be used ‘within’ the United States as required by
section 271(a) unless each of the steps is performed within this country.”).
97 See, e.g., Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96 (D.
Mass. 2009) (“Content service providers Akamai and Limelight both maintain their own
content delivery network . . . consisting of hundreds or thousands of servers located in
multiple locations across the United States and around the world.”), aff’d, 629 F.3d 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2010).  This case has a lengthy, complicated procedural history.  After the
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s en banc interpretation of § 271(b), 134 S. Ct.
2111 (2014), the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately upheld the jury’s verdict of infringe-
ment and reversed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law, Akamai Techs.,
Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL410.txt unknown Seq: 17 11-MAY-17 9:03
2017] extraterritoriality  and  patent  damages 1761
it is not entirely clear that they would infringe the patent of any country,
given such territorial limits.
The court at times has interpreted the infringement provisions that
expressly deal with extraterritoriality in a narrow fashion.  For example, the
Federal Circuit interpreted § 271(f)’s prohibition on the exportation of the
components of a patented invention to exclude method claims.98  By restrict-
ing this provision to only nonmethod patents, the court necessarily restricted
its extraterritorial reach.99  Indeed, it expressly relied upon the presumption
in reaching its conclusion: “In light of the near complete absence of any
Congressional intent to protect patented methods under Section 271(f) and
the explicit Congressional purpose of overruling Deepsouth’s holding, the pre-
sumption compels us not to extend the reach of Section 271(f) to method
patents.”100
The court also narrowly construed a second extraterritorially-related
provision, § 271(g).  This provision defines as infringement the importation,
offer to sell, sale, or use of the product of a patented process, regardless of
where the process was performed.101  The Federal Circuit narrowly inter-
preted this provision to include only tangible items produced by such
processes, and not intangible things like data.102  The court did not expressly
rely upon the presumption against extraterritoriality, although it noted the
legislative history that discussed such territorial limits.103  As such, the scope
of the provision is limited to certain types of methods: a patent holder cannot
regulate the use of her method outside of the United States if it merely pro-
duces information.104
Similarly, the Federal Circuit recently refused to extend the jurisdiction
of the International Trade Commission (ITC) to cover digital files, such as
files for 3D printing objects.105  The ITC has in rem jurisdiction over articles
98 Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(en banc).  The Federal Circuit originally had concluded this provision did apply to
method claims. See Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d
1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
99 For an argument against restricting § 271(f) to method claims, see Timothy R. Hol-
brook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1056 (2017).
100 Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365.
101 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2012).
102 Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“We, there-
fore, hold that in order for a product to have been ‘made by a process patented in the
United States’ it must have been a physical article that was ‘manufactured’ and that the
production of information is not covered.” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(g))).
103 Id. at 1375.
104 Lower courts have distinguished Bayer, however, when a process produces an elec-
tronic product, such as a 3D digital model or an electronic directory, as opposed to simply
information. See, e.g., Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1076 (C.D.
Cal. 2009); CNET Networks, Inc. v. Etilize, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 985, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
105 See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1286–87
(Fed. Cir. 2015).  For a discussion of how CAD files for 3D printing could constitute direct
“digital” patent infringement, see Daniel Harris Brean, Patenting Physibles: A Fresh Perspective
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entering the United States that would infringe a U.S. patent.106  If the ITC
concludes the article infringes, it can issue an exclusion order that prevents
the article from being brought into the United States.107  Although the court
did not rely on the presumption, it concluded that the term “articles” in 19
U.S.C. § 337 is limited to tangible things and not intangible data.108  Argua-
bly the ITC is not entirely extraterritorial as its jurisdiction is triggered by an
act of importation; nevertheless, this interpretation does narrow the ability of
the ITC to regulate acts outside of the United States that may infringe upon
importation.
The presumption has also come into play in the Federal Circuit’s evalua-
tion of injunctions.  For example, the Federal Circuit concluded it was inap-
propriate to require the return of infringing goods from overseas.109  The
court similarly rejected a contempt finding when parties engaged in activity
outside of the United States that would have been infringing within the
United States, drawing a sharp territorial line.110
2. Examples Where the Federal Circuit Extends the Extraterritorial Reach
of Patents
The Federal Circuit has not been consistent in its application of the pre-
sumption, however.  For example, § 271(a) requires that the various acts of
infringement take place “within the United States.”111  Even in the face of
this strong statutory language, however, the Federal Circuit has afforded
extraterritorial scope to this infringement provision.  A patented system can
be used in an infringing manner even if part of the system is outside of the
United States, so long as “the place where control of the system is exercised
and beneficial use of the system obtained” is within the United States.112
The court thus created a sharp divide between the extraterritorial reach
for Claiming 3D-Printable Products, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837 (2015); and Holbrook &
Osborn, supra note 47, at 1353–70.
106 ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1289; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
107 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d).
108 ClearCorrect, 810 F.3d at 1286–87.  After requesting numerous extensions, the ITC
ultimately did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the case. See No. 15A1262, SUP. CT.
OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/15a1262
.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2017); Theresa Pablos, ClearCorrect: Align, ITC Won’t Appeal to U.S.
Supreme Court, DRBICUSPID.COM (Sept.1, 2016), http://www.drbicuspid.com/index.aspx?sec
=ser&sub=def&pag=dis&ItemID=320278.
109 Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
110 Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 361 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
For a general discussion of extraterritoriality and injunctions in intellectual property cases,
see generally Trimble, supra note 19.
111 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
112 NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Circ. 2005); see also
Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1074 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (finding infringement even
where part of the system was in Norway).
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afforded to patented methods and systems that straddle international
borders.113
The Federal Circuit has also held that offers to sell patented inventions
are infringing, even if all of the negotiations take place outside of the United
States, so long as the contemplated sale is to take place within the United
States.114  Because the offer need not be accepted for there to be an infring-
ing offer, it is possible for there to be infringement of a U.S. patent even if no
activity has ever taken place within the United States.115  In reaching this
conclusion in Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors
USA, Inc., the court acknowledged the presumption; nevertheless it adopted
a rule that greatly expanded the extraterritorial reach of § 271(a).116  Some-
what oddly, under the Transocean rule, domestic negotiations to sell an inven-
tion abroad are not infringing under this rule.117
The Federal Circuit has also held that overseas acts of inducement that
result in domestic infringement are cognizable under § 271(b).118  The
court recognized that, in contrast to § 271(a)’s express territorial restrictions,
§ 271(b) lacks a similar territorial limit.119  As such, the court concluded that
113 See Holbrook, supra note 99, at 1057 (criticizing this dichotomy and arguing that
methods and systems should be treated the same).
114 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617
F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In order for an offer to sell to constitute infringement,
the offer must be to sell a patented invention within the United States.  The focus should
not be on the location of the offer, but rather the location of the future sale that would
occur pursuant to the offer.”).
115 Holbrook, supra note 17, at 1111–12 (“As a result, under the Transocean rule, two
parties negotiating, but not reaching an agreement, to potentially sell something in the
United States could be liable for infringement of a U.S. patent notwithstanding that no
actual commercial activity would take place within the United States.”).
116 Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309 (“We are mindful of the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality. . . . This presumption has guided other courts to conclude that the contem-
plated sale would occur within the United States in order for an offer to sell to constitute
infringement.  We agree that the location of the contemplated sale controls whether there
is an offer to sell within the United States.” (internal citations omitted)).
117 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 831 F.3d 1369, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2016). But
see Holbrook, supra note 19, at 1104 (“The traditional territorial rule is that Congress can
clearly regulate activity that occurs within the United States; thus, regulation of such
domestic negotiations would be within congressional power.” (footnote omitted)).
118 Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1302–03 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In short, where
a foreign party, with the requisite knowledge and intent, employs extraterritorial means to
actively induce acts of direct infringement that occur within the United States, such con-
duct is not categorically exempt from redress under § 271(b).”).
119 Id. at 1302; see also Bernard Chao, Reconciling Foreign and Domestic Infringement, 80
UMKC L. REV. 607, 616–28 (2012) (discussing the extraterritorial expansion of induced
infringement, particularly at the district court level).  Interestingly, Congress added a terri-
torial limitation to the related provision, § 271(c). See Chisum, supra note 14, at 615.
Chisum argues that “[t]here appears to be no policy reason for restricting section 271(c)
in this fashion” and “[t]he change may have been a grammatical indiscretion.” Id.
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the provision can cover some acts outside of the United States that result in
infringing acts within the United States.120
The Federal Circuit has also offered broad interpretations of § 271(f)
that afford greater extraterritorial protection.  The Federal Circuit has held
that there can be infringement under this provision even if the patented
invention is not assembled overseas.121  The court based its decision in part
on the fear of “the appearance of ‘giving extraterritorial effect to United
States patent protection.’”122  Of course, contrary to the court’s suggestion,
permitting infringement regardless of whether the invention has been assem-
bled expands the extraterritorial reach of the provision, rather than con-
tracting it.123  In addition to this interpretation, the court also afforded
expansive interpretations of other aspects of § 271(f), such as noting that a
component can be intangible software124 and that copying of software can
constitute “supplying” the software.125  The Supreme Court, of course,
rejected both of these interpretations.126
The Federal Circuit nevertheless has continued to offer expansive inter-
pretations of § 271(f).  The court has held that liability can attach even when
the party induced to make the device abroad is actually the same entity as the
exporter, thus permitting a party to “induce itself.”127  The court also held
that a single component can constitute a “substantial portion of the compo-
nents” of the claimed invention.128  Both of these holdings provide greater
extraterritorial protection under § 271(f).  The former expands the class of
activity covered by the provision to include both inducement of third parties
and self-inducement.  The latter, of course, expands § 271(f)(1) to include
scenarios where only one component is exported, potentially swallowing
§ 271(f)(2) and its important safety valve of the component having no sub-
120 Merial, 681 F.3d at 1302–03; see also Holbrook, supra note 19, at 506 (“As a result,
parties can be liable for inducing infringement if their affirmative acts occurred outside of
the United States, so long as the acts of infringement themselves occurred within the
United States.” (footnote omitted) (citing Merial, 681 F.3d at 1302)).
121 Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
122 Id. (quoting Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 17
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
123 See Holbrook, supra note 15, at 2146–47.
124 Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
125 AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550
U.S. 437 (2007).
126 See Microsoft, 550 U.S. 437.
127 Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“We first address whether ‘to actively induce the combination’ requires involvement of a
third party or merely the specific intent to cause the combination of the components of a
patented invention outside the United States.  We conclude that no third party is
required.” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1))), cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016)
(mem.).
128 Id. at 1353 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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stantial noninfringing uses.129  The issue of whether exporting a single com-
ponent can infringe under § 271(f)(1) is currently before the Supreme
Court, although the Court declined to take the “self-inducement” issue.130
The Federal Circuit has also viewed the ITC’s jurisdiction broadly at
times.  For example, the court recently held en banc that the ITC’s jurisdic-
tion includes the importation of goods that are not infringing as of the
moment of importation.131  Instead, the ITC can exclude objects that will be
infringing once in the United States if the importer is inducing that subse-
quent infringement.132  In the court’s view, this holding prevented the com-
plete exclusion of § 271(b) from the purview of the ITC.133  As such, the
reach of the ITC over activities outside of the United States is broader.
Finally, the Federal Circuit has permitted some injunctions to have
extraterritorial reach, in contrast with its strict approach in some cases.  In
the face of a recalcitrant infringer, one district court extended its injunction
to cover goods “destined for delivery” into the United States and to require
labels disclaiming any uses within the United States.134  The injunction thus
reached extraterritorial activity, but the Federal Circuit nevertheless found
the injunction’s requirements reasonable in attempting to prevent infringe-
ment within the United States.135
In terms of the presumption against the extraterritorial reach of U.S.
patents, the Federal Circuit’s caselaw is at best a mixed bag.  Notwithstanding
the Supreme Court’s emphasis that the presumption has “particular force” in
patent law, the Federal Circuit has been inconsistent in its application to the
infringement provisions and for injunctive relief.  Interestingly, however, the
Federal Circuit has used a strict view of territoriality in policing damages for
129 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of Intellectual Property Profes-
sors in Support of Petitioners at 11–12, Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 2017 WL
685531 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2017) (No. 14-1538).
130 Life Techs., 136 S. Ct. 2505 (mem.) (granting certiorai as to second question only).
131 Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en
banc).
132 Id. at 1352–53.
133 Id. at 1340 (“A majority panel . . . reason[ed] that there are no ‘articles that
infringe’ at the time of importation when direct infringement does not occur until after
importation.  In doing so, the panel effectively eliminated trade relief under Section 337
for induced infringement and potentially for all types of infringement of method claims.”
(internal citation omitted) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(1))).  Interestingly, the
Federal Circuit is now confronting whether a good faith belief in noninfringement should
not be a defense at the ITC because the relief there is entirely prospective. See Non-Confi-
dential Brief for Appellants at 46–49, Navico Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2016-1533,
(Fed. Cir. June 9, 2016) (relying for argument upon Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme
Court’s Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent Infringement, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1007, 1039–44
(2016); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUT. & HIGH TECH L.J. 399, 405–07 (2006); Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of
Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1603–04 n.162 (2011)).
134 Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr v. Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesell-
schaft, 903 F.2d 1568, 1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
135 Id. at 1578.
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patent infringement, even in a context where such restriction may not be
appropriate.  The next Part explores this aspect of Federal Circuit doctrine.
II. DAMAGES AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Although the Federal Circuit’s decisions have explored the extraterrito-
riality of patent infringement in terms of liability—and to a lesser extent
injunctive relief—it only recently has explored the issue of damages that
could flow from activities outside of the United States.  In this context, the
courts have encountered two areas of law that arguably conflict with each
other.  Under Federal Circuit law, damages are generally tied to the eco-
nomic harm to the patentee by the act of infringement.  For example, lost
profits are permitted if infringement is the but-for cause of the lost sales and
if such losses are foreseeable.136  Overseas pecuniary losses likely can satisfy
these conditions at times.137  Yet, the presumption against extraterritoriality
would suggest that, absent some statement from Congress, such damages
should be unavailable, cutting off recovery to the patent holder notwithstand-
ing the actual economic harm incurred.  This Part explores the intersection
of compensatory damages and territorial limits.  It first offers an overview of
the law of damages and then explores damages for foreign conduct under
§ 271(a) and § 271(f).
A. The Law of Patent Damages Generally
The Patent Act provides that damages are to be compensatory in nature.
The statute specifically requires that “the court shall award the claimant dam-
ages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than
a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer,
together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.”138  The Supreme
Court has explained the compensatory nature of patent damages under this
provision.139  In General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., the Court was technically
addressing the appropriate standard for the award of pre-judgment interest
under § 284.140  The Court nevertheless offered an exposition on the nature
of patent damages to inform its assessment of the pre-judgment interest stan-
dard.  As the Court noted, prior to § 284, patent holders could receive the
infringer’s profits as a remedy for infringement.141  In 1946, Congress elimi-
nated the recovery of the infringer’s profits as a remedy; instead the patentee
136 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1542–46 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
137 See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (Wallach, J., dissenting in part) (“So long as there is a sufficient connection between
the infringement and the foreign activity, plaintiffs who successfully establish infringement
under United States law should be able to rely on foreign activities to measure those
damages . . . .”).
138 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
139 See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983).
140 Id. at 649 (“This case concerns the proper standard governing the award of prejudg-
ment interest in a patent infringement suit under 35 U.S.C. § 284.”).
141 Id. at 654.
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is to receive “full compensation for ‘any damages’ he suffered as a result of
the infringement.”142  Congress’s “overriding purpose” was to “afford[ ] pat-
ent owners complete compensation.”143
Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed
the proper measure of compensatory damages under section 284 of the 1952
Patent Act, for either lost profits, price erosion, or reasonable royalties, leav-
ing the development of the law exclusively to the Federal Circuit.144  The
seminal case at the Federal Circuit dealing with damages, and particularly
lost profits, is its en banc decision in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.145  The issue
in Rite-Hite was whether a patentee could recover the profits for lost sales of a
device not covered by the patent-at-issue.146  The court was faced with one
methodology that focused on the patent claims themselves, which would
limit lost profits only to forgone sales of the patented invention.  The other
would focus on the economics of the market, allowing for profits for any sale
displaced by the infringer’s device.  The court adopted the latter, thus
embracing an economic, market-driven approach to compensatory dam-
ages.147  The court thus rejected an approach that drew a somewhat arbitrary
line based on the patent’s scope and instead adopted one focused on the
real-world consequences of the infringing act.  The Federal Circuit has con-
tinued to elaborate on the required hypothetical market reconstruction nec-
essary to allow lost profits.148
142 Id. at 654–55 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1587, at 1 (1946)).
143 Id. at 655.  The Court therefore concluded that courts should ordinarily (although
not automatically) award prejudgment interest to patent owners. Id.
144 The Supreme Court has addressed patent damages before the 1952 Patent Act, but
not recently. See, e.g., Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536 (1886).  The Supreme
Court has reviewed the standard for enhancing damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284. See Halo
Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).  A plurality of Justices discussed
damages and concerns with a patentee’s potential double recovery under § 284 in the con-
text of contributory infringement, but this part of the Court’s opinion is not precedent.
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 502–14 (1964) (plurality
opinion).  The Supreme Court reviewed damages for infringement of design patents in its
October 2016 term, but the review was specific to the unique design patent statute permit-
ting a patent holder to recover the infringer’s lost profits on the article of manufacture.
See Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 436 (2016) (holding that the
article of manufacture need not be the entire product); see also 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2012)
(stating that the infringer “shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit”).
145 56 F.3d 1538, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
146 Id.; see also id. at 1556 (Nies, J., dissenting in part) (“The patentee’s property rights
do not extend to its market in other goods unprotected by the litigated patent.”).
147 Id. at 1546 (majority opinion) (“Being responsible for lost sales of a competitive
product is surely foreseeable; such losses constitute the full compensation set forth by Con-
gress, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, while staying well within the traditional mean-
ing of proximate cause.  Such lost sales should therefore clearly be compensable.”).
148 Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (discussing the reconstruction of the market to determine if noninfringing alterna-
tive was “available”).
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The Supreme Court has also recognized price erosion as a form of com-
pensable harm for patent infringement.149  The Federal Circuit has
extended such protections to the 1952 Patent Act.150  Price erosion techni-
cally is a variation of lost profits: instead of losing profits from a lost sale of
the patented invention, the patentee has lost profits on its own sale of the
patented device because it had to reduce its price in the face of competition
by infringers.151
While it would seem that price erosion would be fairly common,152 in
fact it is rarely asserted in litigation.  First, the patentee would have to prove
that it lowered price due to the infringement and not due to other market
conditions, which can be difficult to do.153  Arguing that the patentee has
reduced price in the face of infringement alters the calculus for possible lost
profits from lost sales: if the patentee’s price would have been higher, then
she can no longer argue that she would have made the sales of the infringer.
The higher price could have resulted in a purchaser simply not buying the
product.  As the Federal Circuit has explained:
[I]n a credible economic analysis, the patentee cannot show entitlement to a
higher price divorced from the effect of that higher price on demand for the
product.  In other words, the patentee must also present evidence of the
(presumably reduced) amount of product the patentee would have sold at
the higher price.  Thus, in harmony with the Supreme Court’s requirement
in Yale Lock, the patentee’s price erosion theory must account for the nature,
or definition, of the market, similarities between any benchmark market and
the market in which price erosion is alleged, and the effect of the hypotheti-
cally increased price on the likely number of sales at that price in that
market.154
A proper price erosion analysis also must account for the risk that, in
light of the higher price, a purchaser would simply not purchase the item at
149 Yale Lock Mfg. Co., 117 U.S. at 552 (holding that an “enforced reduction of price . . .
caused by the infringement . . . is a proper item of damages”).
150 See, e.g., Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d
1348, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Lost revenue caused by a reduction in the market price of a
patented good due to infringement is a legitimate element of compensatory damages.”);
Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336,
1357–61 (Fed. Cir. 2001); BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214,
1220 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
151 See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d
1559, 1578–79 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (discussing “lost profits due to price erosion”).
152 See Roy J. Epstein, State Industries and Economics: Rethinking Patent Infringement Dam-
ages, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 367, 368 (2000) (“Economics predicts that price erosion should be
endemic in infringements, yet such claims are rarely awarded.”); Gregory J. Werden et al.,
Quantity Accretion: Mirror Image of Price Erosion from Patent Infringement, 81 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. SOC’Y 479, 480 (1999) (“[A]wards of price erosion should be more routine.”).
153 See, e.g., Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“This evidence permits the inference that market forces other than infringement influ-
enced the price of fused silica.”); BIC Leisure, F.3d at 1220 (“The record shows that other
market forces, not BIC, forced Windsurfing to lower its prices.”).
154 Crystal Semiconductor Corp., 246 F.3d at 1357.
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all or switch to a noninfringing alternative.155  One area where price erosion
would be the sole measure of damages is infringement for merely offering to
sell the invention, where the patentee lowers price in the face of potential
competition even when no infringing sales are made.156  But, in the main, it
is unsurprising that claims for price erosion damages are infrequently
asserted and not frequently successful.157
Finally, the statute guarantees at least a reasonable royalty for the
infringer’s use of the patented invention.158  The Federal Circuit has even
noted that a reasonable royalty is required unless the evidence is that a rea-
sonable royalty is zero, seemingly a rare occurrence.159  To evaluate a reason-
able royalty, the Federal Circuit has utilized two different methodologies.
The first is an analytical method that “focuses on the infringer’s projections
of profit for the infringing product.”160  The second, “more common”161
approach is a “hypothetical negotiation” where the court imagines a negotia-
tion as of the first date of infringement.162  There are a myriad of factors
involved in assessing what sort of royalty is reasonable.163  This fact-intensive
analysis of course depends on the circumstances of a given case.164
155 SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 709 F.3d 1365, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
156 Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement
for Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms
of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 791–92 (2003).
157 For successful cases, see SynQor, 709 F.3d at 1382; Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221
F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Ortho-
paedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
158 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (guaranteeing “damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the inven-
tion by the infringer”).
159 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Because no
less than a reasonable royalty is required, the fact finder must determine what royalty is
supported by the record. . . . If a patentee’s evidence fails to support its specific royalty
estimate, the fact finder is still required to determine what royalty is supported by the
record. . . . Thus, a fact finder may award no damages only when the record supports a
zero royalty award.” (internal citations omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Williamson v.
Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
160 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also
TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (discussing the use of the
“‘analytical approach’, in which [the magistrate judge] subtracted the infringer’s usual or
acceptable net profit from its anticipated net profit realized from sales of infringing
devices”).
161 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324.
162 Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]he court
confused limitation on damages due to lack of notice with determination of the time when
damages first began to accrue, and it is the latter which is controlling in a hypothetical
royalty determination.”).
163 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (listing fifteen factors); see also Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325 (using the Georgia-Pacific
factors).
164 See, e.g., Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d
1295, 1297, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding the district court erred by failing to take into
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Of course, any measure of damages is necessarily tied to the act of
infringement.  Different acts of infringement may harm a patent holder in
different ways, which require the damages to be tailored to those acts of
infringement.  Moreover, in an increasingly global world, domestic acts of
infringement may impact overseas markets.  Whether these overseas harms to
the patent holder should be compensable, even if the infringement is the
but-for cause of such harm and the harm is foreseeable, has been the subject
of a trio of Federal Circuit decisions.  Here, the Federal Circuit has drawn a
sharp territorial line, creating an interesting (if not perplexing) contrast with
its approach in other circumstances.
B. Damages for Infringement Under § 271(a)
Section 271(a) defines infringement as the use, making, offering to sell,
or sale of the patented invention within the United States, or the importation
of the invention into the United States.165  Any damages to the patentee
must flow from one or more of these acts.  The Federal Circuit has encoun-
tered cases where the domestic act of infringement under this provision trig-
gered, on an economic level, harm to the patentee outside of the United
States.  The question presented in these cases was whether such harm was
compensable.166
The first case in the Federal Circuit’s trilogy addressed whether a paten-
tee could recover lost profits for the infringer’s overseas sales that resulted
from domestic acts of infringement.  Specifically, in Power Integrations, Inc. v.
Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc., the court confronted patents
directed to alleviating electromagnetic interferences and current flow
problems for various power supplies.167  Fairchild was found to infringe, and
its infringement undeniably impacted Power Integrations’s overseas sales,
particularly to Samsung, which were valued at over $500 million.168  The Fed-
eral Circuit, however, declined to award Power Integrations lost profits for
these sales, although the reason for such denial is not entirely clear.169  Any
account that the patent was “standard-essential” and subject to reasonable and nondiscrim-
inatory (RAND) commitment), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2530, 2530 (2016) (mem.).
165 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
166 For excellent discussions of these cases, see Chao, Patent Imperialism, supra note 20;
Chao, Patent Law’s Domestic Sales Trap, supra note 20.
167 Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1357
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
168 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Power Integrations, 711 F.3d 1348 (No. 13-269), 2013
WL 4585328, at *8 (“Fairchild sold the chips manufactured in Maine to Samsung and its
subcontractors overseas—in Korea—for a total revenue of $547,724, and Fairchild also
made direct imports and sales of infringing chips to U.S.-based customers for a total reve-
nue of $218,000.”).
169 For example, the court suggested at one point that some of the allegedly infringing
acts took place outside of the United States, which means there is no infringement and
thus no damages, regardless of foreseeability. Power Integrations, 711 F.3d at 1371 (“Regard-
less of how the argument is framed under the facts of this case, the underlying question
here remains whether Power Integrations is entitled to compensatory damages for injury
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sales to Samsung in South Korea would not be infringing because they would
not be sales or offers to sell within the United States.170
Nevertheless, the court’s analysis suggests that some of the overseas lost
profits were a direct result of domestic acts of infringement under § 271(a).
Even if Fairchild’s infringement was the but-for and foreseeable cause of
Power Integrations’s lost sales worldwide, such damages were not recoverable
due to the territorial limits of U.S. patent law.171  Notwithstanding the factual
ambiguities in the case,172 the court reasoned that “the entirely extraterrito-
rial production, use, or sale of an invention patented in the United States is
an independent, intervening act that, under almost all circumstances, cuts off
the chain of causation initiated by an act of domestic infringement.”173  The
holding is clear, however: even if the lost foreign sales were the direct result
of domestic infringement, the patent holder cannot recover lost profits for
them.
Power Integrations dealt expressly with lost profits, both through lost sales
and price erosion.174  Unsurprisingly, a later case presented the issue of rea-
sonable royalties for overseas losses that were the foreseeable result of domes-
tic infringement.  In Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group,
Ltd., the court confronted patents directed to a method “for improved accu-
racy in the detection of recorded data when certain types of errors are likely
due to the recording medium and reading mechanism.”175  The jury found
that Marvell infringed Carnegie Mellon University’s patents, and awarded a
reasonable royalty for Marvell’s worldwide sales of the infringing
technology.176
The facts with respect to extraterritoriality in this case were clearer than
in Power Integrations.  Marvell had used the patented method within the
United States in an effort to sell the custom-made chips that performed the
patented method to various customers.177  Many of these customers were
outside of the United States, and many of the purchased chips were manufac-
caused by infringing activity that occurred outside the territory of the United States.  The
answer is no.”).
170 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 831 F.3d 1369, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d
1296, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
171 Power Integrations, 711 F.3d at 1371–72.
172 See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Wallach, J., dissenting in part) (“Although the record in Power Integrations does not
clearly describe the nature of the infringing conduct . . . what is clear is that both the
district court and this court found the connection insufficient.” (internal citation
omitted)).
173 Power Integrations, 711 F.3d at 1371–72.
174 Id. at 1376.
175 807 F.3d 1283, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also id. at 1291 (identifying claim four, a
method claim, as representative).
176 Id. at 1291–92.
177 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 986 F. Supp. 2d 574, 593–94
(W.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d in part, vacated and remanded in part, rev’d in part, 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed.
Cir. 2015); see also Chao, Patent Law’s Domestic Sales Trap, supra note 20, at 88.
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tured abroad and never entered the United States.178  Nevertheless, the only
reason customers purchased the chips was the performance of the method
within the United States.  Thus, there was a predicate act of infringement in
the United States that was both the but-for cause of the foreign sales and a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the domestic acts of infringement.
Under the economically-based rationale of Rite-Hite, seemingly compen-
sation would be appropriate.  Undoubtedly, the infringer was liable for any
domestic sales or importation of the chips.179  Indeed, part of the ingenuity
of the patentee’s damages theory was that it did, in essence, create an end-
run of the territorial limits.  Those foreign sales alone would not generate
liability; the patent holder could not have brought a claim in the United
States if only the foreign sales were at issue.  Yet the foreseeability prong of
Rite-Hite arguably makes these foreign sales a cognizable harm.
The Federal Circuit nevertheless rejected awarding damages for chips
manufactured and sold outside of the United States.180  Drawing on the terri-
torial limits of § 271(a), the Federal Circuit offered the following legal rule:
Where a physical product is being employed to measure damages for the
infringing use of patented methods, we conclude, territoriality is satisfied
when and only when any one of those domestic actions for that unit (e.g.,
sale) is proved to be present, even if others of the listed activities for that
unit (e.g., making, using) take place abroad.181
By this reasoning, for damages to be recoverable for infringement, one
of the infringing acts delineated in the Patent Act must occur domestically,
178 Carnegie Mellon, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 594 (“As noted, the chips are manufactured by
TSMC foundry in Taiwan, and then sent to the customers’ manufacturing sites in Asia to
be put into their HDDs.  These HDDs are then sold primarily to laptop manufacturers,
which incorporate the HDDs into their products at their own factories.  A portion of the
laptops are then imported back into the United States.” (internal citations omitted)).
179 Carnegie Mellon, 807 F.3d at 1308 (“We therefore affirm the judgment insofar as the
royalty rests on imported chips.”); see also id. (“[A] new trial is needed to determine
whether the sales are properly said to have been in the United States.”).
180 Id. at 1307 (“Although all of Marvell’s sales are strongly enough tied to its domestic
infringement as a causation matter to have been part of the hypothetical-negotiation agree-
ment, that conclusion is not enough to use the sales as a direct measure of the royalty
except as to sales that are domestic (where there is no domestic making or using and no
importing).”).  The court permitted damages for those chips that entered back into the
United States. Id. at 1305 (“Marvell makes no meaningful extraterritoriality argument
against—and we see no problem with—applying the royalty rate to chips that do enter the
United States.”).  Interestingly, the court left open the potential for damages for “chips
made and delivered abroad, and never imported into the United States”: there could be
damages if “those chips can fairly be said to have been sold here.” Id. at 1305–06.  For a
critique of this dynamic, see Chao, Patent Law’s Domestic Sales Trap, supra note 20, at 92
(arguing for a bright-line rule that location of sale is where delivery takes place).
181 Carnegie Mellon, 807 F.3d at 1306.  It is somewhat odd, however, that the claim
infringed here is a method, yet the measure of damages is a device for performing the
method.  Typically methods can only be infringed through use, so one would think the
measure of damages would be a royalty for use of the method. See Holbrook, supra note
99, at 1041–42.
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even if others do not.  The court believed this rule to be in line with the one
articulated in Power Integrations.182
Consequently, the court has embraced a bright-line rule against afford-
ing relief for extraterritorial damages under § 271(a), even if those harms
would satisfy the economically-based test of Rite-Hite.  In some regards, this is
similar to the other holding in Rite-Hite regarding the ability of a patent
holder to recover lost profits from convoyed sales.183  A patent holder can
recover damages for lost sales of complementary articles but only if particular
requirements are met.  The patentee must show that the invention and the
other article operate as a functional unit.184  Bundling of goods simply for
marketing purposes is not sufficient to allow recovery, even though, economi-
cally speaking, the patentee may have lost those sales due to infringement.185
This rule thus places a legal, noneconomic restriction on the economically
driven causation rule for damages.186  Under Power Integrations and Carnegie
Mellon, territorial limits place a similar, noneconomic limit on infringement
damages under § 271(a).
C. Damages Under § 271(f)
Of course, § 271(a) is not the only infringement provision in the Patent
Act where issues of damages for extraterritorial conduct has arisen.  The Fed-
eral Circuit has faced a similar dynamic in determining what damages should
be appropriate under § 271(f).  In WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical
Corp.,187 the technology involved systems “used to search for oil and gas
182 See Carnegie Mellon, 807 F.3d at 1307 (“In the lost-profits context, this court indicated
in Power Integrations that, where the direct measure of damages was foreign activity . . . it
was not enough, given the required strength of the presumption against extraterritoriality,
that the damages-measuring foreign activity have been factually caused, in the ordinary
sense, by domestic activity constituting infringement under § 271(a).  We think that the
presumption against extraterritoriality, to be given its due, requires something similar in
the present royalty setting.” (internal citation omitted) (citing Power Integrations, Inc. v.
Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2013))).
183 Cf. WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Wallach, J., dissenting in part) (using the entire market value rule to argue against
a strict territorial rule because profits can be awarded for noninfringing articles).
184 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“All
the components together must be analogous to components of a single assembly or be
parts of a complete machine, or they must constitute a functional unit.”).
185 Id. (“Our precedent has not extended liability to include items that have essentially
no functional relationship to the patented invention and that may have been sold with an
infringing device only as a matter of convenience or business advantage.”).
186 Cf. id. at 1578 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Yet the
court draws a new bright line, . . . declining to make the injured claimants whole.  The
majority now restricts . . . the patentee’s previously existing, already limited right to prove
damages for lost sales of collateral items—the so-called ‘convoyed’ sales.  Such remedy is
now eliminated entirely unless the convoyed item is ‘functionally’ inseparable from the
patented item.”).
187 WesternGeco, 791 F.3d 1340.  Technically, the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated, and remanded the case to reconsider the issue of enhanced damages in light of
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beneath the ocean floor.”188  The infringer ION sold components to its cus-
tomers, who then used the components in an infringing system to compete
with WesternGeco.189  The infringer did not challenge the reasonable royalty
award, but it did challenge the award of lost profits for the lost sales of ser-
vices to ION’s customers.190  These competitors used the patented system on
the high seas, which is outside of the United States and indeed subject to no
particular country’s laws.191  The majority refused to permit these lost profits
due to their extraterritorial nature.192
The court recognized that § 271(f) provides extraterritorial protection
but nevertheless concluded that Congress gave “no indication” that it
“intended to extend the United States patent law to cover uses abroad of the
articles created from the exported components.”193  The court drew upon
the presumption against extraterritoriality to support its holding limiting
damages, although it failed to consider Morrison in its analysis.194  The court
also relied upon Power Integrations,195 notwithstanding the ambiguity of its
facts.196  The court specifically held that “[u]nder Power Integrations, Wes-
ternGeco cannot recover lost profits resulting from its failure to win foreign
service contracts, the failure of which allegedly resulted from ION’s supply-
ing infringing products to WesternGeco’s competitors.”197  The court faulted
the patentee for “misunderstand[ing] the role of § 271(f) in our patent
law.”198  Specifically, the court warned:
the Court’s decision in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
See WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016) (mem.).  The
Federal Circuit’s decision on remand reinstated its earlier holding regarding territoriality
verbatim, WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016),
so I will be citing to the 2015 decision even though, as a technical matter, it has been
vacated.  Judge Wallach dissented in the original decision and authored another, slightly
different dissent in the post-Halo case.  When discussing Judge Wallach’s views, I will refer
to both dissents separately.
188 WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1343.
189 Id. at 1349 (“ION makes the DigiFINs domestically and then ships them overseas to
its customers, who, in competition with WesternGeco, perform surveys abroad on behalf of
oil companies.”).
190 Id. (“Although ION does not challenge the reasonable royalty award, ION chal-
lenges the award of lost profits resulting from lost contracts for services to be performed
abroad.”).
191 Id. (“ION argues that WesternGeco cannot receive lost profits resulting from the
failure to win these contracts.  The service contracts were all to be performed on the high
seas, outside the jurisdictional reach of U.S. patent law.”); see Elizabeth I. Winston, Patent
Boundaries, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 501, 516–19 (2015) (discussing infringement on the high
seas).
192 WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1349 (“We hold that lost profits cannot be awarded for
damages resulting from these lost contracts.”).
193 Id. at 1350.
194 See id. at 1349–50.
195 Id. at 1350–51.
196 See supra notes 168–73 and accompanying text.
197 WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1351.
198 Id.
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A construction that would allow recovery of foreign profits would make
§ 271(f), relating to components, broader than § 271(a), which covers fin-
ished products.  In fact, § 271(f) was designed to put domestic entities who
export components to be assembled into a final product in a similar position
to domestic manufacturers who sell the final product domestically or export
the final product.  Just as the United States seller or exporter of a final prod-
uct cannot be liable for use abroad, so too the United States exporter of the
component parts cannot be liable for use of the infringing article abroad.199
This analysis ignores the significant differences between § 271(a) and
§ 271(f).  First, it fails to account for the fact that Congress intended § 271(f)
to have extraterritorial effect.  Second, it ignores the intent requirements
found in § 271(f) that dramatically limit its scope relative to the intent-neu-
tral, strict liability regime of § 271(a).  The infringer must have the intent to
induce the combination of components abroad into the claimed inven-
tion.200  More importantly, as the dissent notes, the majority’s analysis con-
flates infringement liability with infringement damages.  The concerns with
similar treatment between § 271(a) and (f) are more about what acts are
captured under those provisions as infringing rather than the damages to be
awarded once a court has found infringement.
Arguably there are other problems with the majority decision, as high-
lighted by Judge Wallach’s dissent.201  Judge Wallach faulted the majority for
impermissibly conflating liability for infringement with the damages that flow
from such liability.202  Judge Wallach noted that Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit precedent has permitted recovery for lost profits arising from over-
seas sales in other contexts in order to provide full compensation to the pat-
entee.203  Indeed, he viewed Power Integrations, if taken at its word, as
199 Id. But see id. at 1359 n.2 (Wallach, J., dissenting in part) (“[T]he majority’s state-
ment ignores the critical distinction between whether a defendant is liable and the amount
for which a defendant is liable.”).
200 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2012) (requiring a party to “actively induce the combina-
tion”); id. § 271(f)(2) (requiring that a party be “intending that such component will be
combined outside of the United States”); see also Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773
F.3d 1338, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. granted on other grounds, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016) (“We
first address whether ‘to actively induce the combination’ requires involvement of a third
party or merely the specific intent to cause the combination of the components of a pat-
ented invention outside the United States.  We conclude that no third party is required.”
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1))); Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364,
1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“On its face, 271(f)(2) requires that the infringer only intend[ ]
that such component will be combined.”).
201 See also infra Section III.B and accompanying text (offering other critiques in light
of RJR).
202 WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1356–57 (Wallach, J., dissenting in part).
203 Id. (discussing Goulds’ Manfacturing Co. v. Cowing, 105 U.S. 253, 254–58 (1881);
Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 642–43, 650 (1915);
and Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1510 n.1, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1984));
see also Kumar, supra note 20, at 16–17 (discussing Goulds’ and Dowagiac).
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inconsistent with this earlier precedent.204  Judge Wallach recognized that
there were factual differences that arguably could distinguish those cases, but
he found those differences to be inapposite (unlike the majority).205  Moreo-
ver, because the use of the patented invention took place on the high seas,
the risks of double recovery and conflicts of law were mitigated; instead, the
greater risk was one of under-recovery for the patent holder.206
Additionally, Judge Wallach highlighted an inconsistency in the caselaw
and the majority’s reasoning.  The majority agreed that precedent permits
the consideration of lost foreign sales as relevant to a reasonable royalty cal-
culation,207 though it rejected the use of them for an assessment of lost prof-
its.208  As Judge Wallach noted, there is no legitimate reason to permit
consideration of lost sales in the reasonable royalty context and not in the
lost profits one.
Moreover, WesternGeco and Carnegie Mellon seem at odds with each other,
although admittedly Carnegie Mellon was decided after the original decision in
WesternGeco.  But, after the Supreme Court vacated the earlier decision in
WesternGeco, the Federal Circuit failed to revisit its reasoning in light of Car-
negie Mellon.209  To be fair, the issue of reasonable royalties was not techni-
cally before the court: the infringer had not appealed that issue.210  The
Supreme Court also vacated the judgment in light of the Federal Circuit’s
determination as to willfulness, not damages.211  Nevertheless, the language
embracing such royalties in WesternGeco is at best in tension with Carnegie
Mellon’s general refusal to provide reasonable royalties on foreign sales
absent some other domestic nexus.
Ultimately, Judge Wallach attempted to reconcile the precedent in this
area related both to damages (a` la Rite-Hite) and territoriality.  As he noted in
his dissent on remand from the Supreme Court: “The key issue left unad-
dressed in the now-reinstated opinion’s analysis is: When a patent holder suc-
cessfully demonstrates both patent infringement under United States law and
204 WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1359 (Wallach, J., dissenting in part) (“Read in isolation,
this statement is inconsistent with Goulds’, Dowagiac, and Railroad Dynamics.”); see also Wes-
ternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Wallach,
J., dissenting in part) (“If the statement [in Power Integrations] is read too broadly, such that
it prohibits any consideration of foreign activities when measuring damages, it conflicts
with Supreme Court precedent holding that ordinary sales abroad can in some cases be
used to measure damages resulting from domestic infringement.”).
205 WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1357–58 (Wallach, J., dissenting in part).
206 Id. at 1360–61.
207 Id. at 1362–63.
208 Id. at 1363 n.5.
209 Judge Wallach did consider the impact of Carnegie Mellon in his dissent, viewing it as
a “guidepost[ ]” for determining where to draw the line for damages. WesternGeco, 837
F.3d at 1367–68 (Wallach, J., dissenting in part).
210 WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1349 (“ION does not challenge the reasonable royalty
award.”), cert. granted, judgment vacated, WesternGeco LLC. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 136
S. Ct. 2486 (2016) (mem.).
211 WesternGeco, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (vacating in light of Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electron-
ics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016), which addressed willful infringement).
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foreign lost profits, what degree of connection must exist between the two
before the foreign activity may be used to measure the plaintiff’s dam-
ages?”212  The majority did answer that question, however, consistent, in its
view, with Power Integrations and Carnegie Mellon: never.  There are no dam-
ages for such extraterritorial conduct.
III. SHOULD THESE PROVISIONS BE TREATED THE SAME? RETHINKING THESE
OUTCOMES IN LIGHT OF RJR NABISCO
In Power Integrations, Carnegie Mellon, and WesternGeco, the Federal Circuit
has articulated a fairly bright-line rule against awarding damages for extrater-
ritorial consequences that flow from domestic infringement.  In this way, the
court has stepped away from its more economically-driven analysis for com-
pensatory damages.  Moreover, the court seems to approach the issue simi-
larly for the different infringement provisions at issue.  The majority in
WesternGeco embraced the reasoning of Power Integrations to support its
conclusion.
It is not clear, however, that such uniformity is merited.  Indeed, the
Supreme Court’s methodology—suggested in Morrison but elaborated with
particularity in RJR—suggests an analysis that differs from the Federal Cir-
cuit’s.  Of course, RJR was issued after Power Integrations and Carnegie Mellon.
WesternGeco on remand was decided after RJR and could have taken the new
methodology into account, although neither the majority nor the dissent did.
Judge Taranto in Carnegie Mellon did recognize aspects of the Morrison analy-
sis and indeed offered a more nuanced analysis of these issues.213  Neverthe-
less, taking RJR to heart affords a different analysis regarding the issue of the
territorial limits of patent damages, and it suggests that § 271(a) and § 271(f)
should be treated differently.  As this Part elaborates, the strict territorial lan-
guage of § 271(a) suggests its reach should be similarly narrowly tailored.  In
contrast, § 271(f) is designed to allow patent holders to regulate foreign mar-
kets; given this focus of the statute, it should be given far wider berth in
assessing damages.
RJR provides a two-step methodology for assessing the extraterritorial
reach of a statute.214  Specifically, a court first should determine “whether
the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is,
whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extra-
territorially.”215  An affirmative response to step one is sufficient, and a court
212 WesternGeco, 837 F.3d at 1365 (Wallach, J., dissenting).
213 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“What constitutes a territorial connection that brings an action within the reach of
a United States statute must ultimately be determined by examining the ‘“focus” of con-
gressional concern’ in the particular statute.  For the present context, we think that
§ 271(a) provides the basis for drawing the needed line.” (citation omitted) (quoting Mor-
rison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266–67 (2010))).
214 See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.
215 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016).
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need not go to step two.216  But a negative answer to step one does not end
the inquiry.217  If the presumption is not rebutted under step one, then a
court next must “determine whether the case involves a domestic application
of the statute . . . by looking to the statute’s ‘focus.’”218  In particular,
[i]f the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States,
then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other con-
duct occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a
foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial
application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S.
territory.219
The Court applied the presumption to individual provisions of a given
statute, not merely globally to the entire statute.220  Under RJR, the presump-
tion applies to various types of provisions, including substantive, jurisdic-
tional, and remedial aspects of a statute.221
Unlike the Federal Circuit’s analysis in Power Integrations, Carnegie Mellon,
and WesternGeco, the use of the RJR methodology provides different results
for the two provisions at issue.  Technically, the provision at issue is § 284,
which of course contains no territorial limitations at all.222  The statute
requires “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement,” thus ren-
dering the provision entirely dependent on the Patent Act’s various defini-
tions of infringement under § 271.223
The various infringement provisions in § 271 differ significantly in their
scope and purpose, with many subsequent provisions adopted to address vari-
ous policy concerns that arose over time.  Section 271(e), for example, is part
of the Hatch-Waxman Act, creating a new form of infringement for filing an
Abbreviated New Drug Application while also providing a safe harbor from
infringement for using the invention to prepare such materials.224  More apt
to this Article, Congress specifically enacted § 271(f) and (g) to close per-
ceived “loopholes” in patent protection due to the various territorial limits of
216 Id. at 2103 (“Here, however, there is a clear indication at step one that RICO
applies extraterritorially.  We therefore do not proceed to the ‘focus’ step.”).
217 Id. at 2101 (“What if we find at step one that a statute clearly does have extraterrito-
rial effect?  Neither Morrison nor Kiobel involved such a finding.  But we addressed this issue
in Morrison, explaining that it was necessary to consider § 10(b)’s ‘focus’ only because we
found that the statute does not apply extraterritorially.”).
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 2099 (applying the presumption to 18 U.S.C. § 1962 and § 1964(c)
individually).
221 Id. at 2108; see also Gardner, supra note 30, at 139 (noting that the presumption is to
“be applied separately to every statutory provision, whether substantive, remedial, or
jurisdictional”).
222 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
223 Id.; see also id. § 271 (defining “infringement of patent”).
224 Id. § 271(e). See generally Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669–74
(1990) (discussing various “distortions” that § 271(e) is designed to correct).
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§ 271(a).225  Thus, it is inappropriate to “lump and dump” all of the infringe-
ment provisions together, as the Federal Circuit appears to have done, for
purposes of assessing the appropriate extraterritorial scope of damages.
Indeed, RJR made clear “that one statutory provision may take its geographic
scope from another,” suggesting that damages pursuant to § 284 for viola-
tions of § 271(a) and § 271(f) could be, and should be, different given their
explicitly different territorial scopes.226
A. Applying the RJR Framework to § 284 Damages for Infringement
Under § 271(a)
Section 271(a) has very explicit territorial restrictions.227  Any remedy
under § 284 would be linked to these territorial limits.228  Applying the RJR
test, step one clearly is not satisfied.  The statute is specifically limited to acts
“within the United States” and importation of the invention “into the United
States.”229  It is hard to imagine a starker expression of territorial limits, per-
haps short of an additional sentence saying “We really mean it!”  This lan-
guage is also pregnant with historical interpretations of the territorial limits
of patent law, where the Supreme Court has noted that U.S. patents have no
effect outside of the United States.230 Brown v. Duchesne is particularly illumi-
nating as to the relationship between infringement and damages, as the
Supreme Court noted that “the use of [the patented invention] outside of
the jurisdiction of the United States is not an infringement of his rights, and
he has no claim to any compensation for the profit or advantage the party may derive
from it.”231
Concluding that the presumption has not been rebutted under step one
of the RJR framework does not end the inquiry into the potential extraterri-
torial reach of damages under § 271(a), however.  Step two requires an analy-
sis of the “focus” of the provision.232  As the Supreme Court explained,
225 See Holbrook, Territoriality Waning, supra note 3, at 719–23.
226 Dodge, supra note 31, at 48.
227 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
228 Dodge, supra note 31, at 48 (“RJR indirectly supports this line of cases by holding
that one statutory provision may take its geographic scope from another.”).  Here, dam-
ages under § 284 would take the territorial limits of § 271(a).
229 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
230 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972) (“The statute
makes it clear that it is not an infringement to make or use a patented product outside of
the United States.”), abrogated by 35 U.S.C. § 271(f); see also Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn.
Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (“The right conferred by a patent under our
law is confined to the United States and its Territories and infringement of this right can-
not be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country.” (citation omitted)); Brown v.
Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1857) (“But these acts of Congress do not, and
were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States; and as the patentee’s
right of property and exclusive use is derived from them, they cannot extend beyond the
limits to which the law itself is confined.”).
231 Brown, 60 U.S. at 195–96 (emphasis added).
232 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL410.txt unknown Seq: 36 11-MAY-17 9:03
1780 notre dame law review [vol. 92:4
If the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States,
then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other con-
duct occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a
foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial
application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S.
territory.233
By considering the “conduct relevant to the statute’s focus,” necessarily
this step requires consideration of the particular facts of any case and its rela-
tionship to the statutory provision at issue.  Generalization, therefore, can be
difficult because a given fact scenario may implicate the focus differently.
In some ways, this language regarding the statute’s focus requires an
inquiry as to whether the relevant behavior has a sufficient domestic nexus
such that is it is appropriate to apply U.S. law.234  Although the Federal Cir-
cuit has not yet had occasion to apply the RJR framework to its analysis of
extraterritoriality for patent infringement liability, one could rationalize their
holdings on this basis.  The “focus” of § 271(a) is on acts of using, making, or
selling the invention within the United States.  In NTP, the court effectively
determined that the “use” of the patented system fell within the United
States, notwithstanding that part of the system was in Canada.235  As such, the
facts in NTP would satisfy step two of RJR.  The same can be said of Trans-
ocean’s ruling that the location of the contemplated sale of the invention
determines the locus of infringement, even if all negotiations take place
outside of the United States and the sale is never consummated.236  The act
of economic appropriation—the focus of the statute—is within the United
States, satisfying step two.237
233 Id.
234 Cf. Holbrook, supra note 15, at 2170–71; see also Gardner, supra note 30, at 138
(“[A]t step two, judges get to decide what domestic contracts count in which cases (deter-
mining the ‘focus’ of a statute, after all, is a rather mushy directive).”).
235 NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“When
RIM’s United States customers send and receive messages by manipulating the handheld
devices in their possession in the United States, the location of the use of the communica-
tion system as a whole occurs in the United States.”).  Of course, the analysis of the focus of
§ 271(a) does not explain why method claims are not afforded similar treatment. See Hol-
brook, supra note 99, at 31–32.
236 Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617
F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“This company would generate interest in its product in
the U.S. to the detriment of the U.S. patent owner, the type of harm that offer to sell
within the U.S. liability is meant to remedy.  These acts create a real harm in the U.S. to a
U.S. patentee.” (internal citation omitted)).  Of course, the odd consequence of this rea-
soning is that there can be infringement of a U.S. patent for offering to sell the invention
even if no actual activity takes place in the United States, likely contrary to the “focus”
analysis of RJR. See Holbrook, supra note 19, at 1112 (“[U]nder the Transocean rule, two
parties negotiating, but not reaching an agreement, to potentially sell something in the
United States could be liable for infringement of a U.S. patent notwithstanding that no
actual commercial activity would take place within the United States.”).
237 See Lemley et al., supra note 19, at 123 (“We think that the case is better understood
as reinvigorating the dormant line of ‘locus of infringement’ cases, and that the court
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The analyses with respect to step two’s application to Power Integrations
and Carnegie Mellon depend on the facts of those cases.  It is unclear where
the acts of infringement took place in Power Integrations, as is the relationship
between any infringing acts within the United States and possible extraterri-
torial losses of sales.  As such, it is hard to say whether the “focus” analysis of
step two of the RJR framework would be satisfied.  Given the territorial limits
of § 271(a), though, it would seem appropriate to reject such extraterritorial
damages in the face of ambiguous facts.  If the sales for which lost profits
were sought all took place outside of the United States, then the focus of the
statute does not contemplate such sales, particularly absent a clear antece-
dent act of domestic infringement.
In Carnegie Mellon, in assessing the availability of a reasonable royalty for
foreign activity, Judge Taranto appropriately picked up on the “focus” lan-
guage of Morrison,238 which became step two of the RJR test.  Consistent with
my view of the appropriate analysis for damages, the court turned to § 271(a)
to assess the “focus” for damages purposes.239  The court noted that having a
domestic act of infringement should be sufficient to trigger damages.240  The
court then noted that one of those infringing acts must occur relative to
some physical instantiation of the invention, which, in this case, was a
method claim.241  The method, therefore, had to be performed entirely
within the United States.242  The court recognized, of course, that the basis
for measuring damages may not be the same infringing act: the claim was a
method claim, requiring practice of the method for infringement, yet dam-
ages were measured by sales of something that performs the method.243
would limit its holding to cases in which the acts that collectively constitute infringement
occurred primarily, though not exclusively, in the United States.”).
238 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“What constitutes a territorial connection that brings an action within the reach of
a United States statute must ultimately be determined by examining the ‘“focus” of con-
gressional concern’ in the particular statute.” (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,
561 U.S. 247, 266–67 (2010))).
239 Id. (“For the present context, we think that § 271(a) provides the basis for drawing
the needed line.”).
240 Id. (“It [§ 271(a)] states a clear definition of what conduct Congress intended to
reach—making or using or selling in the United States or importing into the United States,
even if one or more of those activities also occur abroad.”).
241 Id. (“Where a physical product is being employed to measure damages for the
infringing use of patented methods, we conclude, territoriality is satisfied when and only
when any one of those domestic actions for that unit (e.g., sale) is proved to be present,
even if others of the listed activities for that unit (e.g., making, using) take place abroad.”).
242 As the Federal Circuit made clear in NTP, for method claims, all of the steps of the
method must be performed within the United States for there to be infringement.  NTP,
Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
243 Carnegie Mellon, 807 F.3d at 1306–07 (“Significantly, once one extends the extrater-
ritoriality principle to confining how damages are calculated, it makes no sense to insist that
the action respecting the product being used for measurement itself be an infringing
action.  Thus, here the claim is a method claim, but the damages-measuring product prac-
tices the method in its normal intended use and the hypothetical negotiation would have
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Such reasoning gestures towards providing relief for these extraterritorial
sales, yet the court pivoted to Power Integrations and a sharper limit on extra-
territorial damages:
We think that the presumption against extraterritoriality, to be given its due,
requires something similar in the present royalty setting.  Although all of
Marvell’s sales are strongly enough tied to its domestic infringement as a causation
matter to have been part of the hypothetical-negotiation agreement, that con-
clusion is not enough to use the sales as a direct measure of the royalty
except as to sales that are domestic (where there is no domestic making or
using and no importing).244
Aside from ignoring the relationship between the nature of infringe-
ment—the use of a method—and the damages for chip sales, the court’s
analysis suddenly shifted from a focus on the nature of the infringement to
simply embracing a bright-line proscription on a reasonable royalty for for-
eign sales.  In this way, the court’s focus is too much on § 271(a) without
appropriately considering the need to provide compensatory damages under
§ 284.  Under the court’s own reasoning, there seems to be a sufficient
domestic act (the use of the method) that is closely tied to the requested
damages (a reasonable royalty that accounts for foreign sales).  There is noth-
ing, other than the presumption, to suggest that the link between infringe-
ment and extraterritorial damages is not strong enough.  To the contrary,
the court makes clear that such extraterritorial conduct would be reasonably
foreseeable as part of a hypothetical negotiation, yet the court concludes that
such relief is not available to the patent holder.
This is not to suggest the ultimate outcome is incorrect, and there may
be strong policy reasons to agree with the court’s conclusion.245  The court’s
analysis, however, diverges from the Supreme Court’s “focus” analysis in Mor-
rison and RJR.  When one considers the Supreme Court’s call for compensa-
tory damages for infringement, the first part of the Federal Circuit’s analysis
would lend itself to recovery for foreign activity: there is a prefatory act of
domestic infringement, and the damages that flow from that act would be
foreseeable enough to be part of a reasonable royalty analysis.  Yet the court
draws a bright, fairly arbitrary territorial line.  A more appropriate analysis
under RJR would likely stop at the textual analysis in § 271(a): infringement
must be within the United States for using the method, and the appropriate
measure of damages should be tied to that injury.  The other injuries that
flow from the infringement are beyond the focus of the statute, as would be
employed the number of units sold to measure the value of the method’s domestic use
(before production and after), as discussed above.  In these circumstances, the inquiry is
whether any of the § 271(a)-listed activities with respect to that product occur domesti-
cally.” (internal citation omitted)).
244 Id. at 1307 (emphasis added).
245 See Chao, Patent Imperialism, supra note 20, at 86–90.
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any commensurate remedy.  Thus, the result would be the same, but the
analysis would be narrower and more consistent.246
B. Applying the RJR Framework to § 284 Damages for Infringement
Under § 271(f)
The error of the majority’s analysis in Carnegie Mellon can be seen more
readily when the RJR framework is applied to damages for infringement
under § 271(f).  Step one under RJR is clearly satisfied: the purpose Congress
had in passing this provision was to overrule Deepsouth and provide a remedy
for patent holders, which has the effect of allowing them control over foreign
markets.247  Although there is a domestic act—the supplying of components
from the United States—necessarily the market implicated by the provision is
one outside of the United States.248  Thus, the provision is intended to have
extraterritorial reach.249
Considering this reach in conjunction with damages under § 284
strongly suggests that extraterritorial damages are appropriate.  As such, Wes-
ternGeco is simply wrong.  The court’s reasoning shows this error.  The court
noted that “[s]ection 271(f) does not eliminate the presumption against
extraterritoriality.  Instead, it creates a limited exception.”250  This statement
is true and, as the Supreme Court has noted, “when a statute provides for
some extraterritorial application, the presumption against extraterritoriality
operates to limit that provision to its terms.”251  In the case of § 271(f), how-
ever, the terms are clear: patentees are protected against exportation of the
components of the invention in circumstances where the exporter could
compete with the inventor in foreign markets.252  Those are the terms of the
provision.  The Court’s more recent decision in Life Technologies, where it fails
to mention the presumption, is consistent with this view of § 271(f).253 The
presumption is rebutted at step one.
Technically, there is no reason to consider step two of the RJR analysis at
this point, even though RJR does not truly explain what should happen if
step one is satisfied.254  Nevertheless, in the interest of thoroughness,255 step
246 Part of the issue here may also be how far removed these damages are from the
actual acts of infringement. See infra Part V (suggesting a need to reevaluate Rite-Hite’s
foreseeability limitation on patent damages).
247 See Kumar, supra note 20, at 26–27.
248 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)–(2) (2012).
249 Part of the problem with RJR, however, is that the “Court has not provided similar
guidance on what to do when the presumption is rebutted.”  Gardner, supra note 30, at
138.
250 WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 442, 455–56 (2007)).
251 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010) (citing Microsoft, 550
U.S. at 455–56).
252 WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1351.
253 See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text.
254 Gardner, supra note 30, at 138.
255 And recognizing that I could be wrong about step one . . . .
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two’s consideration of § 271(f)’s “focus,” in conjunction § 284’s remedial
purpose, further supports affording damages for extraterritorial acts.256
Congress designed the statute to protect patent owners against the territorial
arbitrage present in Deepsouth.  Although § 271(f)(1) contemplates domestic
manufacture of components of the invention, the real impact of the statute is
to protect the patentee’s ability to sell the invention in foreign markets.257  Sim-
ilarly, § 271(f)(2) provides even greater protection to patentees by affording
similar protection when a party exports a component with no substantial
noninfringing uses.258
The Federal Circuit’s statement in WesternGeco that “[t]here is no indica-
tion that in [passing § 271(f)], Congress intended to extend the United
States patent law to cover uses abroad of the articles created from the
exported components” is flatly contrary to the clear language of the statute
and ignores the compensatory nature of damages.259  The focus of the stat-
ute is the foreign markets in which the patentee may operate.  As such, to be
compensatory under § 284, the full panoply of damages would seem appro-
priate even if the harm arose in a foreign jurisdiction.  If the lost sales of
services in WesternGeco would be appropriate damages if it had occurred
within the United States, then they should be appropriate if outside.
In this regard, WesternGeco is wrongly decided on a number of levels.  To
begin, in its initial decision, the Federal Circuit failed even to cite Morrison,
let alone perform a proper analysis of the statute’s focus, in contrast to the
court’s analysis in Carnegie Mellon.260  Next, the court failed to cure this over-
sight on remand after Halo.  While Halo technically related only to the
enhanced damages aspect of the decision, the Supreme Court had decided
RJR at that point.  The Federal Circuit, in reconsidering its judgment, should
have taken into account Morrison, Kiobel, and particularly RJR in its post-Halo
decision.  The law arguably had changed, which would merit reconsideration
by the court.  Moreover, the court erred in relying on Power Integrations.261
That case dealt with § 271(a), a different statutory provision with a different
focus in terms of territoriality.262
The court’s reasoning is flawed in other ways, as well.  The court sug-
gested that “§ 271(f) was designed to put domestic entities who export com-
ponents to be assembled into a final product in a similar position to domestic
manufacturers who sell the final product domestically or export the final
product.”263  That is true, at one level, but it ignores that there is no protec-
256 Kumar, supra note 20, at 26–27.
257 Id. at 27.
258 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
259 WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1350.
260 See Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1306 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
261 See WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1350.
262 Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
263 WesternGeco, 791 F.3d. at 1351.
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tion afforded patent holders against exportation, with the exception of
§ 271(f).264  To export the invention, the exporter would infringe by making
the claimed invention within the United States; the sale in connection with
the exportation would be one outside of the United States that would not be
infringing.265  Moreover, § 271(f) is not coextensive with § 271(a) given the
knowledge requirements present in § 271(f).266  So, the concern that “[a]
construction that would allow recovery of foreign profits would make
§ 271(f), relating to components, broader than § 271(a), which covers fin-
ished products”267 is overblown and ignores the purpose underlying
§ 271(f).  An application of RJR, therefore, suggests that the Federal Circuit
was wrong to deny the lost profits in WesternGeco, assuming such sales were
foreseeable under Rite-Hite.
C. Application of RJR to These Cases Demonstrates a “One-Size-Fits-All”
Approach Is Not Appropriate
The above application of the RJR framework demonstrates that damages
for extraterritorial conduct will depend both on the infringement provision
involved and the nature of the damages sought. RJR reflects a fairly case-
specific analysis, a nuance not present in the Federal Circuit’s analyses in
Power Integrations and WesternGeco. Carnegie Mellon, with its discussion of Mor-
rison and the focus of the statute,268 is more consistent with RJR, though
arguably the court’s analysis is flawed. It appears, though, that WesternGeco’s
failure to account for either step of RJR impermissibly limited the damages
available to the patentee in that case.  The Federal Circuit did err, however,
by treating the territorial limits as to damages under § 271(a) and (f) as
related. RJR makes clear that the reasoning for territorial damages under
§ 271(a) need not, and should not, inform § 271(f), and vice versa.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH—CONSIDERING CONFLICTS
WITH FOREIGN LAW
All of the above analysis treats the issue of the territorial limits on patent
damages as binary: either damages will be permitted or not.  Of course,
courts could—and should—provide a more nuanced analysis that expressly
264 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (limiting infringement to making, selling, offering to
sell, or exporting).
265 Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972) (“Its argu-
ment that Deepsouth sells the machines . . . cannot carry the day unless it can be shown
that Deepsouth is selling the ‘patented invention.’  The sales question thus resolves itself
into the question of manufacture: did Deepsouth ‘make’ (and then sell) something cogni-
zable under the patent law as the patented invention, or did it ‘make’ (and then sell)
something that fell short of infringement?” (footnote omitted)), abrogated by 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f).
266 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2).
267 WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1351.
268 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
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considers one of the key policies that underlie the presumption: potential
conflicts with foreign law and sovereigns.269
All of the Supreme Court cases addressing the presumption specifically
recognize that one reason for the presumption is to avoid such conflicts.270
At times, this concern is articulated as aspects of comity.271  At others, it is
couched in terms of separation of powers, because the executive branch, not
the courts, is in the best position to address issues involving foreign rela-
tions.272  Thus, concern for conflicts with other sovereigns drives much of
the justification for the presumption.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Morrison made clear that the pres-
ence or absence of a conflict is irrelevant to the application of the presump-
tion.  The Court stated, “The canon or presumption applies regardless of
whether there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign
law.”273  Taking this rhetoric to the extreme, the Court explained that
“[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application,
it has none.”274  The latter statement is hyperbole because the Court also
made clear that the presumption is not a clear statement rule.275  The former
statement, however, is arguably inconsistent with the Court’s own precedent.
The Court actually has considered potential conflicts with foreign law
expressly under the particular facts of the various cases.  For example, in Benz
v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., the Court looked at the particular choice of
law within the contract at issue: “The seamen agreed in Germany to work on
the foreign ship under British articles.  We cannot read into the Labor Man-
269 The Court has noted that “the presumption has a foundation broader than the
desire to avoid conflict with the laws of other nations.”  Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc.,
509 U.S. 155, 174 (1993).  But such conflicts drive much of the analysis, and the Court
failed to address what other such concerns could be. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S.
197, 204 n.5 (1993) (“But the presumption is rooted in a number of considerations, not
the least of which is the commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with
domestic concerns in mind.”).
270 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (noting that the
presumption “serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of
other nations which could result in international discord”).
271 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“More recent lower court precedent has also tempered the extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act with considerations of ‘international comity.’”).
272 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“The presump-
tion against extraterritorial application helps ensure that the Judiciary does not errone-
ously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not
clearly intended by the political branches.”); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353
U.S. 138, 147 (1957) (“For us to run interference in . . . a delicate field of international
relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.
It alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy decision where
the possibilities of international discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain.”).
273 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (citing Sale, 509 U.S. at
173–74).
274 Id.
275 See Holbrook, Foreign Patent Law, supra note 3, at 602–07.
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agement Relations Act an intent to change the contractual provisions made
by these parties.”276
In Kiobel, the Court was concerned with what courts may do given the
discretion afforded to the courts under the Alien Tort Statute, which “allows
federal courts to recognize certain causes of action based on sufficiently defi-
nite norms of international law.”277  In this context, the Court applied the
presumption, recognizing that “the danger of unwarranted judicial interfer-
ence in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context of the ATS,
because the question is not what Congress has done but instead what courts
may do.”278
Even in RJR itself, the Court’s analysis noted that “providing a private
civil remedy for foreign conduct creates a potential for international friction
beyond that presented by merely applying U.S. substantive law to that foreign
conduct.”279  The Court seemed to limit the language in Morrison by noting,
“Although ‘a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law’
is not a prerequisite for applying the presumption against extraterritoriality,
where such a risk is evident, the need to enforce the presumption is at its
apex.”280  Of course, Morrison made no reference to conflicts being a prereq-
uisite; instead the Court noted that the “presumption applies regardless of
whether there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign
law.”281  The Court nevertheless considered the risk of “nongovernmental
plaintiffs that are not so sensitive to foreign sovereigns’ dignity.”282
Even more apt to the intellectual property context, the Supreme Court
expressly considered potential conflicts of law in assessing whether the Lan-
ham Act,283 the federal trademark statute, should have extraterritorial reach.
In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., the accused trademark infringer was a U.S.
citizen selling arguably infringing counterfeit watches in Mexico.284  In
reaching its conclusion that U.S. trademark law could apply to this activity,
the Court considered that the accused infringer no longer owned the mark
in Mexico, eliminating a potential conflict.285  The Supreme Court cited Bul-
276 353 U.S. at 146–47.
277 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
278 Id.
279 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016) (citing Kiobel, 133
S. Ct. at 1665).
280 Id. at 2107 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,
561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).
281 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added) (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173–74 (1993)).
282 RJR, 136 S. Ct. at 2108.
283 Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified at 15 U.S.C § 1051 (2012)).
284 344 U.S. 280, 281 (1952).
285 Id. at 289 (“Mexico’s courts have nullified the Mexican registration of ‘Bulova’;
there is thus no conflict which might afford petitioner a pretext that such relief would
impugn foreign law.  The question, therefore, whether a valid foreign registration would
affect either the power to enjoin or the propriety of its exercise is not before us.”).
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ova in Morrison286 and did not overrule it, even though Bulova’s considera-
tion of conflicts with Mexican law is in tension with Morrison’s suggestion that
conflicts are irrelevant.  The courts of appeals have varied in their applica-
tions of Bulova, but all of their various formulations include an express con-
sideration of potential conflicts with foreign law.287
Tellingly, the Ninth Circuit recently had occasion to reconsider the
extraterritorial reach of the Lanham Act subsequent to the Supreme Court’s
decision in RJR.288  Applying RJR’s two-step framework, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that, under Bulova, the Lanham Act has extraterritorial reach.289
In assessing whether such protection was appropriate, the court expressly
considered seven comity factors, including conflicts with foreign law.290  The
Ninth Circuit, therefore, viewed Bulova as consistent with the RJR framework;
RJR therefore would permit an express consideration of potential conflicts of
law in assessing whether, under the facts of the case, U.S. law should extend
extraterritorially.  Indeed, such analysis could even arise after step one has
been satisfied as a check on overreaching by U.S. law, even where Congress
has intended the law to cover extraterritorial conduct.291
I have previously articulated the view that, to determine whether U.S.
patent law should apply to extraterritorial conduct, courts should expressly
consider foreign patent law and various conflicts that could arise.292  In its
most formal articulation, my approach reduces to this test: any U.S. patent
should only cover extraterritorial conduct if there would also be infringe-
ment in the foreign jurisdiction.  The variety of potential conflicts of law
could include whether there is a patent in the foreign jurisdiction, ownership
of the patent, the validity of the patent, and infringement of the patent.293
One could also consider whether the case is “foreign cubed,” involving for-
eign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign conduct. 294  The courts
would expressly engage with these dynamics instead of shying away from
them or pretending that they don’t actually consider them.295  This analysis
286 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 271 n.11.
287 See, e.g., McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 121 (1st Cir. 2005) (looking at conflict
of laws as a jurisdictional consideration); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d
633, 639–40, 642 (2d Cir. 1956) (articulating conflicts as one of three factors).
288 Trader Joe’s Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016).
289 Id. at 966.
290 Id. at 972–75.
291 Gardner, supra note 30, at 149 (“Once a judge has determined that Congress
intended a statute to apply extraterritorially, she should assume it does apply extraterritori-
ally, at least up to the limits of international law.”).
292 See Holbrook, supra note 15, at 2163–85; Holbrook, supra note 17, at 1115–21; Hol-
brook, Territoriality Waning, supra note 3, at 748–58.
293 See Holbrook, supra note 15, at 2169 fig. 1 (delineating flow chart for conflicts
analysis).
294 Gardner, supra note 30, at 149.
295 Id. at 150 (“The solution to that remaining [post-step one] uncertainty, however, is
not avoidance, but engagement and reasoned elaboration.”).
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generally addressed concerns with infringement liability.  There is no reason
its logic could not be, nor should not be, extended to the issue of damages.
Indeed, drawing on this literature, Sapna Kumar recently has advocated
for an approach to damages under § 271(f) that would consider potential
conflicts of law.296  Under her approach, a court would assess whether
another country’s laws could apply.297  If no, such as on the high seas, then
awarding damages would be appropriate.298  If another country’s law could
apply, then the court would consider the potential conflict with the law of
that country.299
As my previous work has demonstrated, there is no reason to limit this
methodology to any particular provision of § 271, either for liability or for
damages purposes.  Indeed, given the albeit soft harmonization that the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) has
achieved, many of the patent concepts across the world are similar, although
of course not identical.300  United States courts therefore should be able to
more readily wrestle with the variations in the law across countries with less
difficulty than other areas.
The various potential conflicts that I previously identified would also be
applicable in the damages context.  Indeed, a methodology that would use a
conflicts methodology at the liability stage of litigation likely would address
many of the concerns with affording damages for foreign conduct.  For
example, if the patent is owned by someone else in the foreign country, then
damages should not be available.  Similarly, if the defendant can avail itself of
some sort of defense in the foreign jurisdiction, such as a prior user right,
then permitting recovery would create a conflict with foreign law.  In that
context, damages should not be available for the foreign conduct.  Neverthe-
less, a few additional issues merit additional attention.
For example, allowing damages for extraterritorial conduct creates a
greater risk for a patentee to obtain double recovery, once through the
United States and again through another country whose laws could also gov-
ern the infringing conduct.  The facts in WesternGeco provide an example.  If
the court had permitted recovery, the patentee would have obtained dam-
ages from ION for the service contracts that WesternGeco lost to ION’s cli-
ents.  In theory, if WesternGeco had a patent in a foreign jurisdiction where
those customers operated,301 then WesternGeco could have sued those com-
petitors directly for patent infringement in that country.  The patentee thus
296 See Kumar, supra note 20, at 35–36.
297 Id. at 35.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 But see Landers, supra note 19, at 31 (arguing for territorial limits to damages under
TRIPS and other international agreements).
301 The customers operated in the high seas, so technically this was not actually an issue
in the case. See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL410.txt unknown Seq: 46 11-MAY-17 9:03
1790 notre dame law review [vol. 92:4
could receive payment twice for the same infringing conduct.302  A U.S.
court could take account of any foreign judgments in this regard and,
indeed, should recognize such judgments so as to avoid double recovery.303
Another dynamic that a U.S. court would need to consider is the risk of
double exposure to liability for the accused infringer.  If the patent is owned
by a different entity in the foreign jurisdiction, then in theory the accused
infringer could be obligated to pay infringement damages to two different
parties.  Thus, instead of double recovery for the patent holder, the concern
here is double exposure to the infringer due to potential differences in own-
ership.  Some may view this as a nonissue: the same acts can trigger different
liability concerns in different countries.  Nevertheless, as a matter of fairness,
it would seem odd to hold a party liable for infringement twice based on the
same activity mainly due to some sort of difference in ownership of the pat-
ent rights in the various jurisdictions.
Finally, courts may need to take into account truly innocent infringers if
there is no patent that operates in an area outside of the United States.  For
example, one could view the high seas as a quintessential patent-free space
where no damages should be available.  Another approach, however, would
suggest that the high seas represents a place where there is no potential con-
flict of laws.304  Then again, even the high seas could present conflict
problems if other nations decide to extend the reach of their patent laws into
that space.  Thus, even the high seas may not ultimately be patent-free.
Moreover, it may be that someone infringing the U.S. patent is engaged in
foreign conduct in a jurisdiction for which no one has obtained a patent.
Given that patent holders must obtain patents in various countries, it is possi-
ble that an inventor may not obtain a patent in a given country.  They may
thus have a patchwork of protection around the world.  If there is no patent
in the jurisdiction where the foreign conduct at issue arises, it may seem
unfair to hold liable a truly innocent infringer, who is operating in what gen-
erally is viewed as a patent-free area.
Ultimately, the consideration of potential conflicts would provide a
more nuanced analysis.  Issues of comity could be addressed expressly on a
case-by-case basis.  Such consideration would of course add complexity to liti-
gation, but patentees should be prepared for such added costs if they antici-
pate obtaining the exceptional remedy of damages for foreign conduct.
Finally, express consideration of foreign laws could have the laudable effect
of educating U.S. courts about foreign law, potentially providing ways for
informal harmonization and cross-fertilization of approaches to patent law
that may help various countries achieve more optimal protection.
302 See also Landers, supra note 19, at 44–45 (noting the double recovery problem).
303 Cf. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002)
(advocating for and proposing an intellectual property-specific law to address the recogni-
tion of foreign judgments in intellectual property litigation).
304 Kumar, supra note 20, at 35–36.
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V. IS IT TIME TO REVISIT RITE-HITE’S PROXIMATE
CAUSE/FORESEEABILITY PRINCIPLE?
The facts of Power Integrations, WesternGeco, and Carnegie Mellon also pre-
sent an issue beyond the territorial limits of patent damages.  When one
looks at the acts for which damages are sought, they are fairly removed from
the initial infringing act, regardless of territorial lines.
For example, in Carnegie Mellon, the infringed patent was for a
method.305  The law strongly suggests that the only way to infringe a patented
method is by using it.306  One could argue that the measure of damages,
therefore, should be a royalty for the use of the method and not for the sales
of the chips that perform the method.  Likely a royalty rate for using the
method would reflect the potential for those downstream sales, discounted
appropriately to account for time and risk.  But it isn’t clear why the reasona-
ble royalty should be based on the actual sales of the chips themselves, partic-
ularly because sales of the chips alone are not infringing; there would only be
infringement when the chips are used to perform the method.307  The court
effectively permitted an end-run of the liability limits by providing damages
for these sales of the chips themselves.308  The courts have stretched the fore-
seeability principle of Rite-Hite quite far, perhaps too far.
A similar dynamic can be seen in the facts of WesternGeco.  The damages
in dispute were not for the sale of the patented invention; instead they were
for lost sales of services that use the system.309  While, in one sense, these lost
sales of services were foreseeable, one could argue that they nevertheless are
too far removed from the act of infringement to be recoverable.
The expansion of foreseeability can be seen in another case.  In Minco,
Inc. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., the Federal Circuit rejected a claim to
damages for lost profits for the infringer’s sale of its business to a third party
due to the infringement.310  The theory was in part that, absent the infringe-
ment, the purchaser of the infringer would have purchased the patentee
305 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1289 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
306 See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (“The ’938 patent claims a method for producing asphalt, not the apparatus for
implementing that process.  Thus, the sale in the United States of an unclaimed apparatus
alone does not make Gencor a contributory infringer of the patented method.”); Joy
Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (describing Standard Havens as
follows: “the method claims of the patent at issue were held not directly infringed by the
mere sale of an apparatus capable of performing the claimed process”). See generally Hol-
brook, supra note 99, at 26–34 (discussing inconsistent treatment of method claims in vari-
ous contexts).
307 Joy Techs., 6 F.3d at 773.
308 Holbrook, supra note 99, at 1042.
309 See WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
310 95 F.3d 1109, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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instead, entitling it to some of the profits from the sale.311  The Federal Cir-
cuit could have rejected this theory of damages as a legal matter because such
damages were too remote from the infringing acts under Rite-Hite’s proxi-
mate cause prong.  The court did no such thing.  Instead, the court declined
to provide such damages due to a lack of proof and fear of double recov-
ery.312  Had the court viewed these asserted damages as too remote, it could
have simply rejected the theory outright in lieu of couching its reasoning on
issues of proof.  The Minco holding suggests that the Federal Circuit views
Rite-Hite’s proximate cause as affording capacious recovery of damages.  The
foreseeability analysis should be the lever used to police such overreaching,
yet it seems to have little bite in these cases.
Mark Lemley, in a forthcoming article, has addressed this issue more
broadly in the context of intellectual property law generally.313  His concern
is where IP remedies permit the rights holder to control downstream, nonin-
fringing product.  He offers a number of factors that should inform the anal-
ysis of when such control is appropriate.  In particular, he highlights the
importance of willful acts of infringement and the extent to which an
infringer adds value to a downstream product.314
Elsewhere, I have expressed concerns with assessing damages for down-
stream 3D printing of patented inventions once a computer-aided design
(CAD) file has spread, permitting infinite reproduction of the invention.315
Such concerns about the remedy are particularly valid if such CAD files them-
selves can be viewed as a form of infringement.316  Similar concerns have
arisen with self-replicating inventions such as genetically-modified crops.317
Some academics have begun to work on this front.  Dmitry Karshtedt has
started to shine a light on patent law from the perspective of tort law instead
of the more typical lens of property law.318  In particular, he has discussed
the appropriate damages for indirect patent infringement using comparisons
311 Id. at 1120 (“According to Minco, had CE not infringed its patent, Imetal would
have purchased Minco instead.”).
312 Id. at 1121.
313 Mark A. Lemley, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree in IP Law (Stanford Pub. Law, Work-
ing Paper No. 2867099, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=286
7099.
314 Id. at 29–31.
315 See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Remedies for Digital Patent Infringement in the 3D
Printing Landscape: A View from the U.S.A., in 3D PRINTING, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, AND IP
LAW (Mark A. Lemley & Dinusha Mendis eds., forthcoming 2017).
316 See Daniel Harris Brean, Patenting Physibles: A Fresh Perspective for Claiming 3D-Printable
Products, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837, 848–60 (2015) (arguing that patent applicants
should be able to claim CAD files); Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 47, at 1358–64 (argu-
ing that selling or offering to sell a CAD file that prints the claimed invention is direct
infringement).
317 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
318 Dmitry Karshtedt, Causal Responsibility and Patent Infringement, 70 VAND. L. REV. 565
(2017) [hereinafter Karshtedt, Causal]; see also Dmitry Karshtedt, Damages for Indirect Patent
Infringement, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 911 (2014) [hereinafter Karshtedt, Damages] (noting the
inconsistency of rules of damages from the perspective of tort law).
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to tort law to explore when limiting damages in these contexts is appropri-
ate.319  Jason Rantanen has explored various aspects of patent law’s views of
fault.320  I offered an alternative view of method claims that would permit
infringement of sales of apparatuses that perform the process and have no
substantial noninfringing uses.321
The issue of the appropriate link between the acts of infringement and
the consequent damages is beyond the scope of this Article.  The territorial
issues addressed here highlight the need to revisit Rite-Hite and its formula-
tion of foreseeability and proximate cause.  It may be that the courts have
unintentionally, and perhaps erroneously, grabbed onto the concept of fore-
seeability while failing to recognize its tie to proximate cause.  The two ideas
may not be coextensive, and courts may need to consider divorcing the two.
For example, one could view the grafting of a territorial limit to damages not
as a distinct doctrine that conflicts with Rite-Hite but instead as an appropri-
ate limit within the proximate cause analysis.
It may be time to revisit the foreseeability/proximate cause aspect of
Rite-Hite.  While the Federal Circuit noted that “the reasonable limits of liabil-
ity . . . can best be viewed in terms of reasonable, objective foreseeability,” it
also noted that “the question of legal compensability is one ‘to be deter-
mined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common
sense, justice, policy and precedent.’”322  That was the primary point of one
of the dissenters in Rite-Hite—the damages at issue there were too far
removed from the act of infringement to be compensable.323  Proximate
cause gives courts a lever to use to rein in damages awards for activities too
far removed from the act of infringement.  It may well be time for courts and
commentators to address this aspect of Rite-Hite and to reconsider whether
the “foreseeability” analysis has gone too far.  I leave that to future work.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has taken a renewed interest in the extraterritorial
reach of United States laws.  Patent law is one part of that “tapestry,” albeit an
important one.324  The Federal Circuit, however, has misapprehended the
presumption in the context of patent damages.  This Article suggests a more
nuanced approach to addressing damages for extraterritorial conduct: an
319 Karshtedt, Damages, supra note 318, at 955–76.
320 Rantanen, supra note 133.
321 See Holbrook, supra note 99, at 38–41.
322 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quot-
ing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 279 (5th
ed. 1984) (citing 1 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 110
(1906))).
323 Id. at 1556 (Nies, J., dissenting in part) (“To constitute legal injury for which lost
profits may be awarded, the infringer must interfere with the patentee’s property right to
an exclusive market in goods embodying the invention of the patent in suit.”).
324 See Holbrook, supra note 2, at 71–72 (noting the Supreme Court’s rejection of pat-
ent law exceptionalism, including in the area of extraterritoriality).
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express consideration of foreign patent law to avoid any potential conflicts.
This approach satisfies the Supreme Court’s concerns that underlie the pre-
sumption, and it would be consistent with the Court’s analysis in Bulova.  It
could also create an opportunity for cross-jurisdictional dialogue among
courts to aid in understanding and potentially harmonizing our patent laws.
